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I. INTRODUCTION
The student of environmental policy is exposed to a myriad of
policy instruments the government can employ: emissions taxes,
abatement subsidies, marketable allowances, regulation based on per-
formance standards or technology, property rights, deposit-refund
schemes, information programs, liability rules, and a number of re-
lated policy tools.  When Congress crafts environmental legislation or
administrative agencies promulgate rules to implement environ-
mental policy goals, they must choose from among these policy tools.
In an ideal world, they would employ those instruments that will al-
low the government to meet its goals at the lowest possible cost sub-
ject to external constraints.
One consistent message from the environmental economics lit-
erature is that incentive-based instruments are a more cost-effective
means to achieve environmental goals than alternative policy instru-
ments such as technology-based standards.1  In practice, however, this
1. See, e.g., ROBERT N. STAVINS ET AL., PROJECT 88—ROUND II: INCENTIVES FOR
ACTION: DESIGNING MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 92 (1991) [hereinafter
PROJECT 88].
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counsel has only rarely been heeded.2  In the United States, environ-
mental protection schemes have evinced more diversity than uni-
formity with respect to key characteristics.  Perhaps this diversity
should not be surprising.  Consider the wide variety of activities that
policy instruments are designed to promote: nonpoint source water
pollution control, protection of wetlands, reduction of sulfur dioxide
emissions, clean-up of hazardous waste sites, and protection of en-
dangered species.  Given this tremendous variation among environ-
mental goals and the means of achieving those goals, is there any rea-
son to expect that when it comes to implementation we can exercise a
one-size-fits-all approach to instrument choice?
In fact, what we observe is a plurality of instruments and combi-
nations thereof that have steadfastly defied economists’ and policy
analysts’ prescriptions.3  Part of this deviation between normative
prescription and actual practice can be attributed to political consid-
erations,4 and part to legal constraints.  However, there may also be
normative justifications for choosing instruments outside the in-
creasingly standard incentive-based dyad of taxes and marketable al-
lowances.  While those instruments may minimize the direct cost of
producing environmental services, such as emissions abatement, they
do not necessarily minimize the total social costs.  To see this, how-
ever, requires a reformulation of the standard evaluation criteria that
are applied in most policy instrument studies and a broadening of the
range of instruments under consideration.
The purpose of this article is to provide a conceptual framework
for understanding the policy instruments that the government uses
when it implements environmental policy goals.  Unlike other surveys
that focus on the contrasts among instruments, the emphasis here is
on exploring the continua of instruments that are available for a vari-
ety of applications.  In the process of developing the framework, the
article will advance key ideas related to the choice and structure of
evaluation criteria, the design and role of a taxonomy of instruments,
and the application of lessons from a variety of distinct literatures.
2. See, e.g., Dieter Cansier & Raimund Krumm, Air Pollutant Taxation: An Empirical
Survey, 23 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 59, 59 (1997).
3. See ROBERT W. HAHN, A PRIMER ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN 59 (1989)
[hereinafter HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN].
4. See Robert W. Hahn & Albert M.  McGartland, The Political Economy of Instrument
Choice: An Examination of the U.S. Role in Implementing the Montreal Protocol, 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 592, 609 (1989); see also HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN, supra note 3, at 58-59;
Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Fol-
lowed the Doctor’s Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 107-12 (1989).
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Many studies of policy instruments have identified evaluation cri-
teria by which the performance of policy tools may be judged.5  This
article expands the insights from those analyses by recognizing that
two key criteria can be added to their lists: (1) the differential effects
of policy instruments on the system of public finance and (2) legal
constraints that may render optimal solutions (from a cost-
minimization perspective) infeasible.  Reformulating the evaluation
criteria as a cost-minimization problem provides additional insight
into the nature of the tradeoffs that the policymaker faces in choosing
among the various instruments.6
This article also demonstrates that the taxonomies of policy in-
struments can be re-framed to bring out several factors.  First, while
liability rules, property rights, taxes, marketable allowances, and sub-
sidies are often grouped together as incentive-based approaches,7 the
new framework separates the first two from the latter three to em-
phasize the fundamentally different role that the government plays.8
Second, whereas recent studies have often depicted instrument choice
as a matter of command-and-control versus incentive-based instru-
ments,9 the new framework suggests that this approach is a false di-
chotomy, stemming in part from an overly narrow depiction of the
range of instruments.10  Third, several studies have focused on the
quantity-versus-price relation between marketable allowances and
taxes,11 both of which are coercive tools of the government.  This new
framework demonstrates that the duality relationship of quantity-
versus-prices also exists when government uses its enterprise tools of
subsidies and contracts.12  Fourth, whereas broad review studies of in-
strument choice have largely focused on how policy tools provide in-
centives for efficient pollution abatement, this framework also ad-
5. See discussion infra Part II.A & Table A1 in Appendix.
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Harnessing the Marketplace: We Have to Do More With
Less, EPA J., May-June 1992, at 21, 21-22 [hereinafter Stavins, Harnessing the Marketplace].
8. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
9. See, e.g., ROBERT N. STAVINS, MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 1-2 (Re-
sources for the Future Discussion Paper 98-26, 1998) [hereinafter STAVINS, MARKET-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES].
10. See discussion infra Parts III.B.3.c.
11. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974);
Howard K. Gruenspecht & Lester B. Lave, The Economics of Health, Safety, and Environ-
mental Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1507, 1516-19 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.d.
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dresses the question of who bears the costs of unabated pollution.13
Finally, the new framework suggests that information-related pro-
grams, identified as separate categories of instruments in the policy
literature,14 are in fact addressing different goals, not employing dif-
ferent instruments.15
By restructuring the evaluation criteria and taxonomies of envi-
ronmental policy and economics studies, this new framework facili-
tates the application of the lessons from several distinct literatures:
New Institutional Economics (transaction cost economics),16 public
economics,17 and administrative and constitutional law.18  Applying
lessons from the first two bodies of work elucidates the continuous,
rather than distinct, nature of the relation among the instruments.
Applying lessons from administrative and constitutional law illus-
trates the legal constraints on the instrument choice problem.
In addition to these specific points, this article advances a more
general theme.  In the recent past academics and policy analysts have
emphasized the important efficiency advantages of incentive-based
instruments for addressing pollution abatement.  In that process the
focus of the discussion has narrowed to a subset of environmental
policy tools—specifically, marketable allowances and emissions
taxes.19  While it is important to remember the allocative efficiency
advantages of incentive-based instruments, there is also a reason that
other, seemingly less efficient, instruments exist.  Those reasons are
not purely political or distributional.  In some settings, instruments
such as command-and-control regulation and government production
may provide greater overall economic efficiency than their incentive-
based counterparts.  The optimal choice of policy instrument to im-
plement a particular pollution abatement goal depends upon the na-
ture of the pollutant, the kind of harm the pollutant causes, the avail-
able control technologies, the number and type of polluting entities,
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.
14. See, e.g., Hans Bressers & Pieter-Jan Klok, Fundamentals for a Theory of Policy In-
struments, 15 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 22, 32-34 (1988).
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.g.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
19. For exceptions, see Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-
Control Efficient?  Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999); Gloria Hel-
fand, Standards versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 622 (1991) [hereinafter Helfand, Standards versus Standards].
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and the type of market failure.  In short, when it comes to environ-
mental policy instrument choice, one size does not fit all.
This discussion focuses on the normative issues related to envi-
ronmental policy design, and addresses only tangentially the impor-
tant questions of political economy.  The discussion is based on the
assumption that Congress or an administrative agency has adopted a
new pollution abatement goal and is searching for the policy instru-
ment(s) that will most efficiently implement the program.20  The
treatment is broad brush in nature, attempting to synthesize the vast
amount of analysis available in the environmental policy literature.
Most instrument choice studies first describe the many policy
tools available and then provide evaluation criteria for comparing the
instrument. This analysis reverses that order on the premise that the
taxonomy should be structured to facilitate the evaluation.
II. EVALUATION CRITERIA
Articles that review policy instruments and the instrument choice
problem often provide criteria to assess the relative merits of the
various policy instruments.21  This section provides a brief overview of
the criteria from several studies, suggests logical relations among the
criteria, and identifies useful additions to the list.  This leads to a
reformulation of the criteria as a constrained cost-minimization
problem.
A.  Standard Treatment
Table A1 provides a sampling of the evaluation criteria described
20. While this study is narrowly focused on pollution abatement to maintain tractability in
the discussion, the principles are perhaps much more broadly applicable to environmental pro-
tection, natural resource management, and social regulation generally.
21. See, e.g., Giandomenico Majone, Choice among Policy Instruments for Pollution Con-
trol, 2 POL’Y ANALYSIS 589 (1976); Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative Analysis of
Alternative Policy Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY
ECONOMICS 395 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985); Robert W. Hahn & Robert
N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Hahn & Stavins, A New Era?]; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
REP. NO. DOE/EH-0103, 1 A COMPENDIUM OF OPTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY TO
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL CLIMATE CHANGES:
METHODOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION AND GENERIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS (1989) [hereinafter
U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM]; PROJECT 88, supra note 1; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, REP. NO. OTA-ENV-634, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS—A USER’S GUIDE
(1995) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (James
P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 1995].
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in a number of the studies.  What is perhaps most interesting about
these lists is that they are generally unstructured.  Referring to the
criteria listed in his own work, Majone commented:
The first observation to be made about the criteria is their hetero-
geneity of values; the second is their lack of specificity.  The het-
erogeneity is exemplified by the difficulty of reconciling political
feasibility with the conditions for economic efficiency.  The lack of
specificity is particularly obvious in the case of the polluter-pays
principle, which, as usually interpreted, rules out only the subsidies
alternative; and even this limitation is weakened by a number of
exceptions.22
Although the studies use different terms, they are actually sur-
prisingly consistent on a conceptual level.  All studies listed in Table
A1 refer to some form of efficiency or cost-effectiveness, while three
refer to some form of dynamic incentives to innovate and develop
new abatement technologies.  All of the studies also include criteria
related to the administrative burden, information requirements, or
monitoring costs associated with particular instruments.  The studies
all include criteria related to political feasibility, distribution and eq-
uity effects, or public acceptance.  Four studies incorporate effective-
ness or efficacy as a criterion.  Interestingly, only two of the six stud-
ies reviewed in Table A1 explicitly list flexibility, or adaptability in
the face of change,23 as an important criteria for evaluating policy
tools.  This later point is particularly important, because the ability to
adapt to change can be an important factor that favors non-incentive-
based instruments under certain circumstances.
B.  Expansion and Reformulation of the Evaluation Criteria
Two important criteria are conspicuously absent from the lists in
Table A1.  First, there is no mention in those lists of the costs that are
imposed on society by the distortionary effects that taxes have on
production and consumption decisions.  Generally, when the govern-
ment intervenes in the market, for example, by taxing production or
consumption, it distorts prices, the signals by which the market allo-
cates resources.  This can lead to significant social welfare losses
known as “excess burden.”24  If the instruments have a differential
22. Majone, supra note 21, at 600-01.
23. North has referred to such adaptability in the face of change as “adaptive efficiency.”
See Douglass C. North, Dealing with a Non-Ergodic World: Institutional Economics, Property
Rights, and the Global Environment, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 12 (1999) [hereinafter
North, Institutional Economics].
24. See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC
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impact on the system of public finance, then it is important to include
that effect in the evaluation criteria.
Second, while all of the studies in Table A1 include criteria for
some type of political constraint, none include legal constraints.  It is
important to recognize that for some applications, instruments that
may be theoretically most cost-effective are not available due to legal
constraints.25
If the objective of the instrument choice exercise is to minimize
the social cost of achieving a given environmental goal (as it is as-
sumed to be in the normative context of this framework), then the
evaluation criteria can be structured as a constrained optimization
problem.  Under the cost-minimization formulation, we can identify
three types of economic costs: production costs (PC), implementation
costs (IC), and public finance impacts (TX).  The stylized policy
problem then becomes:
Minimize  (PC + IC + TX)
Subject to the constraints:
Pollution abatement requirement
Legal constraints
Political constraints
Production costs (PC) refer to the actual capital, training, opera-
tion, maintenance and management costs of producing emissions
abatement or other environmental services.  They are generally in-
cluded in evaluation criteria as static efficiency,26 dynamic incentives,27
or cost-effectiveness.28  These are the costs that are most commonly
addressed in the environmental economics literature.
Public finance impacts (TX) have not generally been mentioned
in discussions of environmental policy instrument choice.  In this cost-
minimization problem, TX refers to the costs imposed on the system
ECONOMICS 367-70 (1980); Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxa-
tion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 63, 67-73 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 1985).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
26. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 399; U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at
2-2 (1989).
27. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 400; PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10 (“Will the
policy give industry incentives to develop new environment saving technologies or will it en-
courage firms to retain existing inefficient plants?”).
28. See PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10; see also OTA REPORT, supra note 21, 23-24; B.S.
Fisher et al., An Economic Assessment of Policy Instruments for Combating Climate Change, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 21, at 397, 406.
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of public finance related to instruments’ revenue-raising require-
ments, including excess burden and administration costs.
Transaction or implementation costs (IC) have been analyzed in
the transaction costs/contracts literature,29 but this work has not been
extensively applied to environmental policy.30  The evaluation criteria
in Table A1 include terms for information requirements,31 ease of
monitoring and enforcement,32 demand on government resources,33 and
adaptability and flexibility in the face of changes in tastes, technology,
resource use, and the economy.34  Lessons from the environmental
economics and New Institutional Economics literatures both provide
insight into how policy instrument selection affects implementation
costs.35
The first constraint in the cost-minimization formulation is that
the instrument employed to implement environmental policy must
accomplish the desired policy goal or target level of abatement.  That
is, the instrument must provide efficacy or assurance that the goals will
be met.36  In addition, legal and political constraints limit the range of
instruments that can be used under particular circumstances.  The
cost-minimizing instrument, in other words, may not be in the feasible
set.  Table A1 includes references to political constraints,37 under-
29. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985).
30. There is a potential for confusion regarding the scope of transaction costs.  Some stud-
ies excluded government transaction costs because of the studies’ focus on the private-sector
costs of trading marketable allowances. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and
Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 133, 135 (1995).  Others distinguished be-
tween implementation costs (government-private) and transaction costs (private-private). See,
e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 406.  Since the focus of this article is on government pro-
grams, we will use the term implementation costs to refer to the “costs of acquiring and using
information as well as negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing” the program rules and goals.  See
Louis De Alessi, On the Nature and Consequences of Private and Public Enterprises, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 191, 193 (1982).
31. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 399-400; U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM, supra note
21, at 2-2; PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10;  see infra Table A1 in Appendix.
32. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 400; PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10; Fisher et
al., supra note 28, at 406.
33. See OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 23, 25.
34. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 400; PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10; OTA
REPORT, supra note 21, at 23, 27.
35. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
36. See PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10; OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 23, 26.
37. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 401; U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at
2-2 (adopting “political sustainability” as a criterion for evaluating policy instruments);
PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10 (“Will the policy be truly feasible in terms of . . . enactment by
Congress . . . ?”); Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 407 (adopting “feasibility in terms of political
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standability to the public,38 distributional issues,39 fairness,40 and envi-
ronmental equity and justice.41  These are all incorporated in the cost-
minimization formulation under the rubric of political constraints.  In-
terestingly, none of the works cited in Table A1 recognized legal con-
straints that may limit the range of instruments available for a par-
ticular application.42
III. TAXONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS
A.  Standard Treatment
The environmental policy literature has produced many taxono-
mies of policy instruments over the past 30 years.  Table A2 provides
a summary of the taxonomies contained in a sample of works that
were chosen to span much of the history of the environmental policy
literature and to reflect both recognized academic authorities, gov-
ernment studies, and international agency works.43  The degree to
which the studies cited in Table A2 explicitly outline or simply imply
the taxonomies varies substantially across the studies.44
The taxonomies may be more remarkable for their similarities
than their differences.  Still, there are several important patterns that
emerge.  First, the recognition of direct government expenditure or
government investment virtually disappeared during the 1980s.45  Sec-
implementation” as a criterion for evaluating policy instruments).
38. See PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10.
39. See U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at 2-2; PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 10.
40. See OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 23.
41. See id. at 23, 27.
42. See discussion infra Part IV.D (addressing legal constraints).
43. Table A2 is by no means a comprehensive survey.  It is intended only to represent vari-
ous formulations of the instrument taxonomy.  See infra Table A2 in Appendix.
44. The primary purpose of some of these works was to set forth a comparative discussion
of the range of instruments (see Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 396; U.S. DOE,
COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at 1-14; HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN, supra note 3,
at 6, 9; OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 1), while for others the taxonomy provided context and
support for a more detailed discussion of a particular subset of instruments (see PROJECT 88,
supra note 1, at 2), a particular environmental application (see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
POLICIES AND MEASURES FOR REDUCING ENERGY RELATED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS:
LESSONS FROM RECENT LITERATURE 1-1 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. DOE, POLICIES AND
MEASURES]), or a textbook discussion of general environmental economics (see WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY
OF LIFE 217 (1997); SCOTT J. CALLAN & JANET M. THOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
AND MANAGEMENT: THEORY, POLICY AND APPLICATIONS 105 (1996)).
45. Compare Elvis J. Stahr, Antipollution Policies, Their Nature and Their Impact on Cor-
porate Profits, in ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION: THE CHARLES C. MOSKOWITZ LECTURES 83,
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ond, voluntary agreements are emerging as a separate category of in-
struments.46  Third, several of the taxonomies adopt categories pri-
marily based on the comparison of command-and-control or regula-
tory instruments versus incentive-based or market-based
instruments.47  Fourth, it is common to include information, educa-
tion, and research-oriented instruments with pollution regulation and
incentive-based instruments.48  Interestingly, information, education,
and research are included more commonly in government studies
than in the academic works.49
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, most of the studies treat
the instruments in an ad hoc manner; they are essentially descriptive
lists or menus, lacking any structure that explains the systemic differ-
ences and relationships among the instruments. The next step in
105 (1971); Majone, supra note 21, at 593-94; BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 44, at 218, 223-25;
Bohm & Russell, supra note 21, at 446-47, with, e.g., HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN,
supra note 3, at 10-12, and OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 8-13.  Blackman and Harrington
have written the only recent study in Table A2 to recognize direct government investment. See
ALLEN BLACKMAN & WINSTON HARRINGTON, USING ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY
INSTRUMENTS TO CONTROL FIXED POINT AIR POLLUTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 7 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper
98-21, 1998).  See infra Table A2 in Appendix.
46. See U.S. DOE, POLICIES AND MEASURES, supra note 44, at 2-4; Fisher et al., supra
note 28, at 412; BLACKMAN & HARRINGTON, supra note 45, at 7 (“informal regulation”).
47. See U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at 3-4, 4-5 (comparing primarily "regula-
tion by control" with "fiscal incentives"); HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN, supra note
3, at 10-12; PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 4-9; CALLAN & THOMAS, supra note 44, at 105, 107,
128-31; Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 403-05.
48. See Bressers & Klok, supra note 14, at 33-34 (1988); U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM, supra
note 21, at 5-1 to 6-32; SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
15 (1990) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, REDUCING RISK]; OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 3, 11-13;
U.S. DOE, POLICIES AND MEASURES, supra note 44, at 2-4.
49. Compare U.S. DOE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at 5-1 to 6-32, and SCIENCE
ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES
AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 15 (1990) [hereinafter U.S. EPA,
REDUCING RISK], and OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 3, 11-13, and U.S. DOE, POLICIES AND
MEASURES, supra note 44, at 2-4, with HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN, note 3, at 10-
12, and PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 4-9, and CALLAN & THOMAS, supra note 44, at 105-59.
The Project 88 study is included as an academic work primarily because the project coordinator,
Robert Stavins of Harvard University, seems to have guided the work in that direction, notwith-
standing its ties to two prominent political figures, Senators Timothy Wirth and John Heinz.  In
fact, many of the conclusions appear in subsequent academic publications by Stavins. See gener-
ally Stavins, Harnessing the Marketplace, supra note 7; STAVINS, MARKET-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, supra note 9; Hahn & Stavins, A New Era?, supra note 21; Robert
W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating
Theory and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 464 (1992) [hereinafter Hahn & Stavins, Economic
Incentives].
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developing a new framework for instrument choice is to create a tax-
onomy that provides the needed structure.
B.  Reformulation of the Taxonomy
The discussion in the previous section illustrates several different
methods for categorizing policy instruments.  This section proposes a
new taxonomy that will facilitate analysis of the constrained optimiza-
tion formulation of the instrument choice problem.
1.  Principles of a Taxonomy
A useful taxonomy reflects general principles of scientific classi-
fication, informing the user about the important similarities and dif-
ferences among the various items in the classification.50  Taxonomy is
a “scheme that partitions a body of knowledge and defines the rela-
tionships among the pieces. It is used for classifying and understand-
ing the body of knowledge.”51
Taxonomy generally employs an organizing principle to differen-
tiate among the elements of the classification.52  In the taxonomy de-
scribed below, the instruments are organized according to the role
that the government plays in each.  This approach recognizes that,
across instruments, there is significant variation with respect to the
type and degree of government involvement in determining the mar-
ginal cost of abatement, setting and enforcing goals, controlling how,
where, and when pollution abatement will occur, and bearing the
costs of pollution abatement and unabated pollution.  Not only does
this approach elucidate the relation among the instruments in terms
of the government function, but it also provides a map that assists in
the cost-minimization problem.
2.  Dimension 1: Fundamental Role of Government—
Entitlement Assigner vs. Regulator
Individuals or groups often make decisions to engage in activities
that affect others who are not parties to those decisions.  Negative
environmental externalities occur when the spillover effects of the
chosen actions degrade the quality of the environment, possibly
50. See T. ELLIOT WEIER ET AL., BOTANY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PLANT BIOLOGY 383
(1970).
51. INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS, IEEE STANDARD
COMPUTER DICTIONARY: A COMPILATION OF IEEE STANDARD GLOSSARIES § 610 at 198
(1990).
52. For example, in botany and zoology, taxonomies organize species according to evolu-
tionary development.  See WEIER ET AL. supra note 50, at 383.
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leading to allocative inefficiency.  The Coase Theorem states that if
all parties have full information about their costs and benefits, if there
are zero transaction costs, and if property rights are fully assigned and
understood, then parties will bargain to allocatively efficient out-
comes.53  However, if property rights are incomplete or there are high
transaction costs, Coasean bargaining may not occur.54
One efficiency-enhancing role for the government in environ-
mental management, then, is to clarify the assignment of initial enti-
tlements.  Several of the lists in Table A2 include instruments that
address the assignment or redefinition of property rights55 or liabil-
ity.56  The government uses these instruments to address the problem
of incomplete rights and responsibilities, mentioned above in the con-
text of Coasean bargaining.
Calabresi and Melamed have provided a framework for under-
standing the relation between the property rights and liability ap-
proaches to controlling externalities.57  Like Coase, Calabresi and
Melamed recognize that to protect entitlements, the state must decide
whom to entitle.58  They go on to describe a second order decision
that the government must make: whether to protect entitlements with
property rules or liability rules.59  Under a property rule, “someone
who wishes to remove [an] entitlement from its holder must buy it
from him in a voluntary transaction.”60  The current property holder
has the right to refuse a sale.61  The government role, then, is only to
assign the property right and enforce it.62  In contrast, a liability rule
53. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3  J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960).
54. See id. at  15-16.
55. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 44, at 218, 221-23; Majone, supra note 21, at 593,
595-598.  See infra Table A2 in Appendix.
56. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 26, at 433-36; OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 13, 123-
27.  See infra Table A2 in Appendix.
57. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-1115 (1972).  For more on
the role and limitations of environmental liability, see TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R.
LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 135-74 (1991); Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of
Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1991).  On empiri-
cal analysis of Coasean property rights and the role of transaction costs and social norms, see
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
58. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 57, at 1090.
59. See id. at 1092.  Calabresi and Melamed also describe a third approach—inalienable
rights—that is less germane to the topic of this article.
60. Id.
61. See id. ("[A property rule] gives the seller a veto if the buyer does not offer enough.").
62. See id.
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allows someone to “destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to
pay an objectively determined value for it.”63  Under a liability rule,
the government not only assigns the initial entitlement, but deter-
mines the value that must be paid in the case of involuntary transfer.
ENTITLEMENT
POLLUTEE POLLUTER
PROPERTY
RULE
Pollutee may enjoin nui-
sance; polluter must pay
pollutee’s price for right
to pollute
Polluter may pollute;
pollutee must pay pol-
luter’s price to stop
pollution
LIABILITY
RULE
Polluter may pollute, but
must compensate pol-
lutee for damages
Pollutee may stop pol-
lution, but must com-
pensate polluter for loss
Figure 1: Calabresi and Melamed Framework on
Property Rights and Liability Rules
In the context of pollution control, property and liability rules,
coupled with the choice of initial entitlement, create four possible ar-
rangements (see Figure 1).64   The first, and perhaps best recognized, is
a property right that entitles a pollutee to enjoin a pollution nuisance.
To avoid an injunction, a polluter must negotiate a price directly with
the pollutee.  The alternative arrangement, a liability rule, wherein
the pollutee is the party endowed with the entitlement, requires only
that the polluter compensate the pollutee for damages in an amount
determined by the state.  Agreement between the polluter and pol-
lutee is not a prerequisite as it is in the case of the property rule.  Al-
ternatively, of course, the entitlement to pollute may be vested in the
polluter.  Here we are most accustomed to seeing a property rule, re-
quiring the pollutee to pay a price acceptable to the polluter to effect
the cessation of the offending emission.
The three approaches above are moderately familiar to the stu-
dent of law and frequently observed in practice.  Calabresi and
Melamed extend the range of options to include a now operatively
evident, if previously overlooked, instrument based on an entitlement
to pollute, protected by a liability rule.65  They describe this design as
63. Id.
64. See id. at 1115-16.
65. See id. at 1116.
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“a kind of partial eminent domain coupled with a benefits tax.”66
The property rights approach is most applicable when the condi-
tions for Coasean bargaining are approximately met, i.e., when there
are low transaction costs between emitters and receivers of pollution
and where there is sufficient information on the marginal costs of
control and environmental damage.67  Where negotiations are not
possible, either because there is a large number of parties or because
the environmental injury is accidental in nature, then liability rules
may be appropriate if the government is able to establish a proxy
valuation of the environmental damage caused by one party against
another.68
In many important situations, the bargaining process does entail
significant transaction costs, such as coordinating parties, managing
free riders, and gathering information.  Additionally, the government
often is not in the position to establish values to be assessed for li-
ability by one party against another, nor to identify all parties that
have been injured.  So, in the real world, both approaches are often
insufficient.  This raises another important role for the government—
that of regulator.
The first step in the instrument choice process is for the govern-
ment to decide whether to adopt the “Calabresian” role of assigning
property rights and liability rules, or a more involved role as an initia-
tor of environmental protection.  Figure 2 depicts the first dimension
along which policy instruments are distinguished: the role of govern-
ment in determining the degree of environmental protection.  In one
role, depicted on the left-hand-side of Figure 2, the government de-
fines property rights and liability rules and enforces their integrity
when invited to do so. Here the government plays a relatively passive
role.  In the case of property rights, the government relies upon
Coasean bargaining among individuals to determine the efficient level
of environmental protection, intervening only to protect individuals’
assigned rights. For liability rules, the government not only assigns
entitlements but assesses values for various environmental injuries
between parties, hearing cases as they are brought for adjudication.
In its role as regulator, depicted on the right-hand side of Figure
2, the government intervenes when neither property rights nor liabil-
ity rules are practical because of transaction costs, coordination costs,
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1095, 1118.
68. See id. at 1119.
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free-riding, difficulty in setting damages values, or difficulty in identi-
fying injured parties.  In this regulatory capacity, the government sets
environmental quality targets, chooses instruments to accomplish
those goals, monitors compliance, and initiates actions to enforce the
rules.69  This role of government as regulator of environmental quality
is the primary focus of this study.
3. Instruments for Implementing Environmental Goals: The
Regulator Role
The remainder of this article focuses entirely on the right-hand-
69. Even in this role, the government is de facto assigning property rights, though they may
not be legally recognized. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 53 (5th ed.
1998) ("The concept of a de facto property right . . . has broad applicability.  Some economists,
indeed, use the term property right to describe virtually every device—public or private, com-
mon law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or informal—by which divergences
between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.").
Establish Property Rights
Establish Liability Rules
Enforce Rights and Rules
Facilitate Negotiation
  among Private Parties
Regulate
Manipulate Incentives
Intervene Directly
CALABRESIAN ROLE:
ASSIGN RIGHTS/
ADJUDICATE
REGULATOR ROLE:
SET GOALS/INITIATE
ENFORCEMENT
Figure 2: The Fundamental Role
of Government (D-1)
FUNDAMENTAL
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
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side of Figure 2, the instruments that the government uses when it di-
rectly intervenes in environmental protection decisions.
a.  Dimension 2:  Locus of Discretion
Abating pollution requires a decision-maker to choose which
abatement technologies or practices to use.  In some cases the choice
is obvious; in others there are many options.  The second dimension
for distinguishing among policy instruments, then, is the extent to
which the government controls the selection of abatement practices.
If the government retains control for itself, as in the case for com-
mand-and-control regulations, it employs a hierarchical approach to
decision-making.  In contrast, the policy tools commonly referred to
as incentive-based instruments allow the polluter or private parties
themselves to identify the best ways to meet pollution abatement re-
quirements.
b.  Dimension 3:  Distribution of Abatement and Environmental
Damage Costs
Choosing a level of environmental protection commonly involves
balancing two costs—the cost of pollution abatement versus the cost
of environmental damage.  Unless the government chooses an ex-
treme option, such as no abatement or complete abatement, both of
these costs will be part of any final solution.  The third dimension of
the taxonomy addresses which, if any, of these costs will be borne by
government and society as a whole and which will be borne by the
polluter.
c.  A Preliminary Taxonomy
Combining the second and third dimensions, it is possible to
sketch a rudimentary taxonomy of policy instruments, as shown in
Figure 3.  The horizontal dimension in Figure 3 represents the degree
to which the government exercises control over production decisions.
On the extreme right are the instruments (government production and
command-and-control regulation) that, in their purest form, maximize
government control.  These are hierarchical arrangements.  At the ex-
treme left, production decisions are left entirely to private parties un-
der taxes, marketable allowances, subsidies and contracts.  The gov-
ernment monitors only abatement activity or pollution output.
The vertical axis in Figure 3 describes which parties bear the
costs of pollution and its abatement.  At the top, in the case of subsi-
dies, contracts, or government production, society directly, or through
its government agent, bears the cost of both abatement and environ-
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mental damage.  At the bottom, with zero-baseline taxes or auctioned
marketable allowances, regulated parties bear both types of costs
fully.70  Between the two extremes, there are many different distribu-
tions of cost.  One distribution denoted in Figure 3 as grandfathered
allowances occurs at the point where the government grants each firm
allowances equal to that firm’s efficient level of emissions.  The firm
must pay for its own abatement practices, but society as a whole con-
tinues to bear the costs of unabated emissions.  Figure 3 also recog-
nizes that it is possible to reach this type of cost distribution—firms
paying for abatement and society bearing environmental costs of un-
abated pollution—with either incentive-based or command-and-
control systems.
70. If firms’ baselines for taxes are set to zero, then “the scheme reduces to a pure Pigovian
pollution charge.” John Pezzey, The Symmetry Between Controlling Pollution by Price and
Controlling It by Quantity, 25 CAN. J. ECON. 983, 985 (1992) [hereinafter Pezzey, Symmetry].
Government
Production
ABATEMENT
COSTS
Subsidies &
Contracts
RESIDUAL
POLLUTION
COSTS
PRIVATE PARTY
CONTROL
GOVERNMENT
CONTROL
EXTENT OF CONTROL OVER
PRODUCTION DECISIONS
Government/
Society
Government/
Society
Government/
Society
Target-Baseline
Taxes;
Grandfathered
Marketable
Allowances
Command-
and-Control
Regulation
Zero-Baseline
Taxes; Auctioned
Marketable
Allowances
?
Private
Party
Private
Party
Private
Party
Figure 3: Locus of Discretion (D-2) and
Distribution of Costs (D-3)
DISTRIBUTION OF
COSTS
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Unlike the incentive-based instruments, the more conventional
command-and-control regulation provides relatively little or no dis-
cretion to the polluting private party.  In its pure form, command-
and-control regulation employs a technology-based standard that
specifies (de jure or de facto) the technologies that regulated firms
must use to abate pollution.71  This type of regulation controls where
and how pollution abatement will occur and determines the total
amount of pollution allowed.72  In contrast, performance-based stan-
dards are less restrictive than technology-based approaches.  They
may specify rates of pollution removal, emissions concentration, or
simply emissions quantities (in which case they are quotas).  Because
the performance-based standard provides more discretion to the pol-
luting firm regarding how to abate pollution, those types of instru-
ments fall on the interior of Figure 3, to the left of the pure com-
mand-and-control instruments, i.e., technology-based instruments
that leave virtually no discretion to firms.
Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify the defini-
tions of the terms used in Figure 3.  In this discussion, a pure subsidy
will be narrowly defined as an offer by the government to pay a fixed
price per unit of good or service to any and all takers.  By contrast,
when the government uses a pure contract approach to production, it
sets a goal for the amount of good or service it intends to develop and
searches for the least expensive suppliers through competitive bids or
some other market mechanism.73  For example, if the government
wanted to increase the acres of trees in the United States, the subsidy
instrument in its purest form would entail a public offering to pay any
landowner a fixed price per acre of trees planted.  The contract ap-
proach would involve establishing a target number of acres and nego-
tiating agreements with enough landowners to meet the goal.74
71. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA), for example, mandated
the use of “best practicable technology” in Phase I and “best available technology” in Phase II.
See FWPCA §§ 304(b)(1)(A), 304(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(A), 1314(b)(2)(A) (1994).
72. The technology-based standard only controls the nature of the abating activity.  It does
not control the amount of underlying productive activity.  So, for example, a technology-based
standard may determine the emissions per car painted, but not the number of cars painted.
However, the permitting process limits the amount of productive activity, for example the num-
ber of cars painted.  Taken together, the permitting process and the technology-based standard
limit the amount of total emissions from a given source.
73. See ROSEMARY O’LEARY ET AL., MANAGING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES 287 (1999).
74. By this definition, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram was a contractual approach to reducing soil erosion.  The government set a goal of estab-
lishing 45 million acres of highly erodible cropland in soil conservation practices. See Robert
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The government production option involves carrying out envi-
ronmental programs by building on existing and expanded organiza-
tional structures internal to the government.75  For example, at the lo-
cal level municipalities generally provide wastewater treatment and
solid waste disposal.76
The lower two thirds of Figure 3 entails the more familiar envi-
ronmental instruments—taxes, marketable emissions allowances, and
command-and-control regulation.  An environmental tax assesses a
charge per unit of pollution, thus providing incentives to reduce the
level of emissions.77  Auctioned marketable permits are similar, ex-
cept that the total quantity of allowances is fixed and the price is set
by the market.78  To distinguish political considerations and other
Moulton et al., The Timberland in Conservation Reserve Program and Its Effect on Southern
Rural Economies 3 (Mar. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  The U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture then took bids from farmers to enter into 10-year contracts to imple-
ment prescribed land-management practices. See id.:
The CRP involves a ten-year agreement between the Federal government and a
farmer/landowner.  To enter the program a farmer agrees to place the land removed
from production into an approved soil conserving cover for ten years.  The govern-
ment, in turn, agrees to pay the farmer an annual rental payment and half the cost of
the conservation practice’s establishment.
Another example of government contracting is the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s use of private contractors to manage environmental cleanups. See OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ASSESSING CONTRACTOR USE IN SUPERFUND 1-2 (1989)
[hereinafter OTA, ASSESSING SUPERFUND].  During the 1980s, 80 to 90 percent of the Super-
fund program funds went to private contractors each year. See id. at 3.  The government often
enters into negotiated in-kind contracts such as the state of Minnesota’s 1994 arrangement with
Northern States Power Company, an electric utility, that the firm develop ways to generate elec-
tricity from biomass and wind in exchange for permission to expand storage of spent nuclear
waste at its plant in Red Wing. See  MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 31, 1994, at A1.
75. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of
Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1144 (1996) (referring to government
production as “in-house government contracting”).
76. Illustrative of federal-level production are the Federal government’s activities in the
realm of natural resources management, where it furnishes an extensive system of national for-
ests through the U.S. Forest Service and of wilderness areas through the U.S. Department of the
Interior.
77. For example, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, and Japan levy substantial taxes per
unit of sulfur dioxide emissions. See Cansier & Krumm, supra note 2, at 65-66.; ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND GREEN
TAX REFORM 23-27 (1997) [hereinafter OECD, GREEN TAX REFORM]; ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATING ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 16, 19 (1997) [hereinafter OECD, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS].  Nor-
way also introduced a substantial tax on carbon dioxide emissions in 1991. See Haakon Ven-
nemo, Welfare and the Environment: Implications of a Recent Tax Reform in Norway, in PUBLIC
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD 337, 344 (Lans Bovenberg &
Sijbren Cnossen eds., 1995).
78. Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 established a system of marketable
allowances for sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants in the United States. See DALLAS
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complications and constraints from the normative analysis presented
here, it is assumed throughout this discussion that increased govern-
ment revenue from either taxes or auctioned permits is offset by a re-
duction in other distortionary taxes.  That is, these environmental in-
struments are assumed to be revenue-neutral.79
It is also useful to define two terms that are not explicitly in-
cluded in Figure 3.  An expanded notion of instrument choice also
recognizes two government modes of operation: the enterprise mode
and the coercive mode.  Government enterprise refers to that opera-
tional mode in which the government makes direct financial commit-
ments or investments.80  To the extent that private firms are involved,
their participation is voluntary.  In contrast, the coercive mode entails
mandatory participation by private firms.  At the federal level the two
modes operate under different powers, enumerated in Article 1, Sec-
tion 8 of the United States Constitution.81  The enterprise mode is car-
ried out under the spending powers,82 while the coercive mode in-
vokes the taxing and commerce (regulatory) powers.83  The distinction
between these modes of operation helps clarify the relation among
BURTRAW, COST SAVINGS, MARKET PERFORMANCE, AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE U.S.
ACID RAIN PROGRAM 1 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 98-28, 1998).
79. The term “revenue-neutral” simply means that the size of the government budget does
not grow with introduction of new revenue raised through environmental policy instruments.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
80. “Enterprise” is defined as a “venture or undertaking, especially one involving financial
commitment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (5th ed. 1979).  Sax distinguishes between the
government as mediator and the government as participant in economic activities. See Joseph L.
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-64 (1964).  “Government as enterpriser
operates in a host of areas, requiring money, equipment and real estate.” Id. at 62.  Sax implic-
itly recognizes that even in its role as enterpriser, the government must sometimes use the coer-
cive power of eminent domain to accomplish its goals.  But when it uses that power it must pay
compensation, essentially shifting it into a government production instrument.
81. Although the Sixteenth Amendment also addresses Congress’ taxing power, it is spe-
cific to income tax and hence has less connection to the issues discussed in this analysis.
82. Subsidies and contracts can also be implemented under the taxing power if they take
the form of tax credits.  For example, the state of Washington gave $130 million tax break to
Centralia Coal in exchange for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions by 90 percent. See  SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1997, at B2.  The observation that the taxing power can be used to implement
subsidies and contracts does little to change the subsequent analysis, although it does have im-
plications for the political process.
83. The federal government generally regulates the environment under the commerce
power.  State and local governments regulate under the police power.  Although the analysis in
this study focuses primarily on federal action, many of the more general conclusions are rele-
vant to state environmental programs as well.  States also have taxing and spending powers.  To
serve as a reminder of the broader applicability of this analysis, the balance of this study will
recognize three government powers—taxing, spending, and regulatory powers.
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the instruments by focusing on the legal and economic implications of
using each.
Returning to the taxonomy in Figure 3, this diagram of instru-
ments supplements the standard approach to policy instrument
choice.  Over the last decade the environmental instrument choice lit-
erature has largely concentrated its attention on championing the
merits of taxes and marketable allowances.  Generally, these two in-
struments are compared either to each other84 or to command-and-
control regulation.85  Some studies have mentioned alternatives to
these instruments but have done little to explain the circumstances
under which a regulator might choose these alternatives.86  In par-
ticular, few recent environmental policy instrument studies have ad-
dressed the possibility of the government undertaking environmental
protection directly, rather than through taxes, marketable allowances,
or regulation.87  In practice, however, governments often provide
goods and services directly to the public rather than by inducing pri-
vate firms to make those provisions.  Although government produc-
tion is most commonly associated with items such as national defense,
monetary currency, and certain kinds of information gathering and
dissemination, the government also provides many types of environ-
mental amenities either directly or through its contractors.  For ex-
84. See, e.g., Alan Marin, Comment, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in
Pollution Control: Comment, 21 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 297, 297 (1991); JOHN PEZZEY,
CHARGE-SUBSIDIES VERSUS MARKETABLE PERMITS AS EFFICIENT AND ACCEPTABLE
METHODS OF EFFLUENT CONTROL: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS 1-2 (Discussion Paper
No. 90/271, 1990) (on file with Dep’t of Econ., Univ. of Bristol) [hereinafter PEZZEY, CHARGE-
SUBSIDIES]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quan-
tity Regulation 1 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); WILLIAM A. PIZER,
PRICES VS. QUANTITIES REVISITED: THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (Resources for the Fu-
ture Discussion Paper 98-02, 1997); Marc J. Roberts & Michael Spence, Effluent Charges and
Licenses Under Uncertainty, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 193, 194 (1976).
85. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Goulder et al., The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments
for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best Setting, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 329 (1999); Klaus
Conrad & Michael Schröder, Choosing Environmental Policy Instruments Using General Equi-
librium Models, 15 J. POL’Y MODELING 521 (1993); JON NICOLAISEN ET AL., ECONOMICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: A SURVEY OF ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS 7, 16-21 (OECD Economics
Studies No. 16, 1991); Jun Jie Wu et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Relative Efficiency of Pol-
icy Instruments to Reduce Nitrate Water Pollution in the U.S. Southern High Plains, 43 CAN. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 403, 403-420 (1995); Daniel E. Spulber, Effluent Regulation and Long-Run Op-
timality, 12 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 103, 103-04 (1985).
86. See, e.g., HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN, supra note 3, at 12; see also Wu et
al., supra note 85, at 405-07.
87. For example, Fisher et al. mention only in passing the potential for governments mak-
ing direct investments in climate change mitigation, and they did not include it in their list of
instruments. See, Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 414.
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ample, cleanup of hazardous waste sites, wastewater treatment, re-
search and development on green technologies, and environmental
education are all environmental services provided in the United
States by state or federal agencies.  The taxonomy in Figure 3 explic-
itly recognizes the potential for government production.  Application
of principles from New Institutional Economics will help explore
when the government production policy instrument might be most ef-
ficient.88
Another result from the taxonomy in Figure 3 is that, at least in
theory, there must exist an instrument under which private parties
bear both environmental and abatement costs while the government
retains control over abatement decisions.  The fact is, however, that
we have no term for such an instrument, perhaps because as a practi-
cal matter, such an instrument is virtually always politically infeasible.
For now we will leave a question mark in the space corresponding to
that arrangement.89
In contrast to the standard discussion of environmental policy in-
struments, Figure 3 also highlights the fact that there are many inter-
mediate forms of the policy tools.  The specified instruments at the
extreme corners of the diagram refer to instruments exercised in their
“pure” forms.  As indicated by the arrows, for each type of cost dis-
tribution there is a continuum of instruments that combine elements
of the pure instruments.90  Thus, although the figure focuses on the
“pure” instruments, the framework is broad, accommodating not only
the instruments as conceptualized in theory (pure instruments), but as
exercised in common practice (the intermediate instruments of the in-
terior).  As mentioned above, performance standards represent a
modification of technology-based regulation—one that provides firms
with discretion on how to make reductions, but not where, when or
how much reductions are made.  Similarly, marketable allowance
programs requiring government approval of each trade or restricting
who may hold and trade allowances introduce hierarchical elements
that provide for sharing of discretion between the government and
private parties.  In another example, contracts commonly incorporate
a number of different control structures to achieve hierarchy-like out-
88. This analysis is developed infra in Part IV.B.
89. In the stories of Harry Potter, there is a dark wizard so evil that the timid will not speak
his name.  They refer to him only as “You-Know-Who.” J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND
THE SORCEROR’S STONE 100 (1997).  Following that example, perhaps we should simply refer
to the lower right corner of Figure 3 as “The-Instrument-We-Do-Not-Name.”
90. For the analog in private production, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 16.
RICHARDS_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:57 AM
244 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:221
comes.91  Protocols for change orders in government contracts allow
the government to modify the initial agreement without vesting all
control in the government.  These are all examples of instruments fal-
ling in the interior of Figure 3.
In some simple applications—those involving well-behaved pol-
lutants whose emissions are simple to measure and whose abatement
requires only modest specialized investments—one instrument will
minimize all three types of costs (PC, IC, and TX) simultaneously.
This would probably be the case, for example, for a carbon dioxide
emissions reduction program.  Taxes or marketable allowances, with
allowances auctioned rather than grandfathered,92 the lower left cor-
ner of Figure 3, would likely minimize production costs, implementa-
tion costs and negative public finance impacts.
For more complex policy problems, however, the government
makes tradeoffs among the categories of costs. This means moving
away from a single prescriptive outcome that concentrates solely on
production costs.  Rather, efficiency-seeking decision-makers must
seek a set of broadly applicable principles that relate the technologi-
cal and institutional characteristics of specific policies to the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each instrument.  The art of instrument
choice becomes a matter of assessing all three of the cost components
for specific applications.  The preliminary taxonomy must then be fur-
ther refined to reveal the tradeoffs inherent in addressing more com-
plex problems.
d.  Dimension 4:  Prices vs. Quantities
The instruments on the left-hand side of Figure 3 can be further
differentiated according to whether instruments are price-based or
quantity-based (see Figure 4).93  Under perfect information either
price-based or quantity-based instruments can be used to meet a spe-
cific emissions abatement goal at the same marginal production cost.94
91. See Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Contracts as Hierarchical Documents, in ORGANIZATION
THEORY AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT: ADMINISTERING UNCERTAINTY IN NORWEGIAN
OFFSHORE OIL 121, 155-66 (Arthur L. Stinchcombe & Carol A. Heimer eds., 1985); see also
discussion infra Part IV.B.
92. See generally PETER CRAMTON & SUZI KERR, TRADABLE CARBON PERMIT
AUCTIONS: HOW AND WHY TO AUCTION NOT GRANDFATHER 17-18 (Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper 98-34, 1998).
93. Although this article will not explore the issue, it is worth at least raising the question
of whether there are both price- and quantity-based versions of the hierarchical instruments on
the rights-hand side of Figure 3.
94. See Weitzman, supra note 11, at 480 ("In an environment of complete knowledge and
perfect certainty there is a formal identity between the use of prices and quantities as planning
RICHARDS_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:57 AM
Spring 2000] FRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENT CHOICE 245
If a government uses a quantity-based approach as described on the
right-hand side of Figure 4, say issuing a fixed number of marketable
allowances, then it has automatically assured that its emissions limits
will be met, assuming successful monitoring and enforcement.  The
government can also predict what the market clearing price of allow-
ances will be if it knows how the marginal cost of abatement varies
with the level of the emissions limit.  Thus, by choosing the quantity
of emissions, the government also determines the price of the allow-
ances.  Similarly, if the government uses a price-based mechanism,
say a tax on emissions, and if the marginal abatement cost curve is
instruments").
Contracts
ABATEMENT
COSTS
Subsidies
RESIDUAL
POLLUTION
COSTS
PRICE-BASED QUANTITY-BASED
Government/
Society
Government/
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Government/
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Figure 4: Taxonomy of Incentive-Based
Instruments (D-4)
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known with some certainty, then it is possible to predict the level of
emissions.
However, in the presence of uncertainty, either the priced-based
or quantity-based instruments may be preferred.95  Figure 4 demon-
strates that the incentive-based instruments can be distinguished by
(1) whether they rely on price-based or quantity-based controls and
(2) who pays for the abatement costs and the residual pollution costs.
Generally, when there is uncertainty about the marginal cost of
abatement, quantity-based approaches will induce abatement levels
that are closer to the efficient level than will taxes, if the marginal
benefits curve is steeper than the marginal cost curve.96  All things
being equal, taxes will lead to less deviation from the efficient abate-
ment level when the uncertain marginal cost curve is steeper than the
marginal benefit curve.
Intuitively, in their pure form subsidies and contracts have the
same duality relation as taxes and marketable allowances.  Under
perfect information, the government can achieve its goals by either
making price-based offers to buy or by purchasing a fixed quantity of
a good or service from the lowest-cost suppliers.  Pezzey started to
demonstrate this symmetry in his analysis comparing charge-subsidy
schemes with marketable allowances.97  The taxonomy in Figure 4
suggests that the symmetry can be extended to include contracts.98
The quantity-based analog to a charge-subsidy scheme is a market-
able allowance-offset program.  The offsets are contracts under which
the government awards additional marketable allowances to firms
that provide abatement services beyond those that are required.
Thus, the marketable allowance-contract approach is based on the net
quantity of emissions.
95. See, e.g., Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 11, at 1516-19.
96. See Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 11, at 1516.
97. See Pezzey, Symmetry, supra note 70, at 985-87, 989-90.  Under a charge-subsidy
scheme, firms are assigned a baseline effluent property right.  If a firm emits effluent at a level
below the baseline, the government pays it a subsidy proportionate to the amount of the over-
abatement.  On the other hand, if the firm’s emissions exceed the baseline, the firm pays a
charge in proportion to the excess.
98. The new taxonomy also suggests another extension of Pezzey’s analysis by emphasizing
that subsidies and contracts involve government payments while taxes and marketable allow-
ances place abatement costs with private parties.  This means that the choice of instruments has
important implications for the public finance system.  Pezzey asserted that the baseline effluent
rights, which ultimately determine the tax burden of polluting firms in a charge-subsidy scheme,
should be chosen on political grounds. See Pezzey, Symmetry, supra note 70, at 986 ("In a
charge-subsidy scheme, baseline effluent rights . . . for each firm should be chosen entirely on
political grounds . . . .").  In fact, there is a strong normative argument that auctioned market-
able allowances or taxes with a zero-baseline should be preferred.
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e. Dimension 5:  Inputs vs. Outputs and the Degree of
Correlation
The instruments described in Figures 3 and 4 can also be distin-
guished by the measure of performance each uses and the degree of
correlation between actual emissions99 and the measure of perform-
ance.  This dimension is often cast as a choice between controlling
production inputs/outputs and controlling emission outputs.  For ex-
ample, in Table 2A Blackman and Harrington include direct instru-
ments that are based on actual emissions levels and indirect instru-
ments based on either inputs or outputs of production.100  Based on
this distinction, they define environmental taxes as levies on the pro-
duction of inputs or outputs and fees as charges on the actual level of
emissions.101
A more informative construction of this issue addresses the de-
gree of correlation between the performance indicator and the de-
sired outcome.  For example, in the case of carbon dioxide controls,
the amount and type of fossil-fuel inputs to a combustion process can
be used as a highly accurate predictor of carbon dioxide emissions;
that is, there is a high degree of correlation between inputs and emis-
sions.102  In contrast, on the carbon sink side, even field measure-
ments, often the most direct method practical for measuring carbon
abatement services, leave a wide range of uncertainty.103  Thus, the
choice between using direct measurements of emissions or some
proxy for those emissions depends critically upon the specific applica-
tion.  The choice of direct measurement or a proxy also affects the ex-
tent of discretion available to private parties.  The closer regulations
move to using actual emissions as the measure of performance, the
further to the left in Figure 3 is the instrument, and the lower the
compliance costs are likely to be.104
99. In fact, actual emissions are themselves a proxy measure for environmental damage.
100. See BLACKMAN & HARRINGTON, supra note 45, at 2-3.
101. See id. at 1-2 ("[W]e will use the term ’fee’ to refer only to charges on emissions, and
the term ’tax’ to refer only to charges on pollution intensive inputs and outputs").
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REP. NO. DOE/PO-0028, 2 SECTOR-SPECIFIC ISSUES AND
REPORTING METHODOLOGIES SUPPORTING THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE
VOLUNTARY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 1605(B) OF THE ENERGY
POLICY ACT OF 1992, VOLUME 1: ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SECTOR 1.25 (1994) [hereinafter U.S.
DOE, REPORTING METHODOLOGIES].
103. See, e.g., Kenneth Richards & Krister Andersson, The Leaky Sink: Persistent Obstacles
to a Forest Carbon Sequestration Program Based on Individual Projects, 1 CLIMATE POLICY
(forthcoming 2000).
104. See Gloria E. Helfand, Controlling Inputs to Control Pollution 17 (Oct. 1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Helfand, Controlling Inputs].
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f. Dimension 6:  Locus of Discretion—Intertemporal Flexibility
Just as environmental policy instruments can be differentiated
according to the degree of flexibility they give private parties to de-
termine how and where emissions abatement occurs (D-2), instru-
ments can also be differentiated according to the degree of intertem-
poral flexibility they give private parties.  Intertemporal flexibility is
generally referred to as banking, a term used here to encompass both
saving and borrowing.
The flexibility derived from banking provisions is particularly
important in the various incentive-based instruments. Rubin describes
examples of banking provisions in marketable emissions allowances,
noting the provisions in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 to
allow participants in the trading program to bank sulfur dioxide emis-
sions allowances.105  He further notes that, in the context of automo-
bile fuel efficiency, the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE)
system, a type of performance-based regulation, also employs bank-
ing.106  Automobile manufacturers are allowed to bank credits for up
to three years.107  Furthermore, banking was also permitted under
EPA’s emission reduction credit program.108
The rationale for banking is that if the costs of emissions control,
and hence the value of emissions allowances, change over time, in-
tertemporal flexibility enhances allocative efficiency.109  One of the
key questions is whether the government should apply a decay func-
tion to allowances that are saved in the banking program.  In Califor-
nia’s Low-Emission Vehicle Program, vehicle manufacturers are re-
quired to meet average fleet hydrocarbon emissions for automobiles
they sell in the state.110  They are allowed to save and borrow emis-
sions credits, but saved credits lose value “by 25, 50, 75, and 100% af-
ter 1, 2, 3, and 4 model years.”111  Such a scheme appears to discour-
age saving credits (i.e., delaying emissions) and leads to more
105. See Jonathan D. Rubin, A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and
Borrowing, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 269, 269 (1996).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 270.
108. See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 361, 372 (1989).
109. See Catherine Kling & Jonathan Rubin, Bankable Permits for the Control of Environ-
mental Pollution, 64 J. PUB. ECON. 101, 108 (1997).
110. See California Air Resources Board, Low-Emission Vehicle Program (last modified
May 5, 2000) <http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/test_proc.htm>.
111. Jonathan Rubin & Catherine Kling, An Emission Saved Is an Emission Earned: An
Empirical Study of Emission Banking for Light-Duty Vehicle Manufacturers, 25 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 257, 259 n.3 (1993).
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emissions early in the program.  Allocative efficiency would seem to
be better served by paying interest on saved allowances (i.e., having
the size of the allowance grow as a function of the length of time it is
saved in the bank) because the damages associated with the emissions
are delayed.  The actual accrual rate would be a function of the resi-
dence time of the pollutant, the private and social discount rates, and
the path of marginal damages over time.112
g.  Dimension 0:  Information versus Abatement
The instruments depicted in Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the range
of policy tools that the government can use to correct environmental
externalities.  They accomplish this by changing the level of abate-
ment activity, polluting activity, or restoration activity—essentially
setting the level of pollution or environmental services at an optimal
level.
112. See Paul Leiby & Jonathan Rubin, Bankable Permits for the Control of Stock and Flow
Pollutants: Optimal Intertemporal Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading 24 (Mar. 10, 1998) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Leiby & Rubin, Bankable Permits]; Paul
Leiby & Jonathan Rubin, Efficient Greenhouse Gas Emission Banking and Borrowing Systems,
11-12 (May 31, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Leiby & Rubin,
Banking and Borrowing].
TABLE 1: DIMENSIONS FOR DIFFERENTIATING
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
D-0: INFORMATION VS. ABATEMENT
Addressing Public Good vs. Externality
D-1: ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Assigning Rights/ Selecting Rules/Judging vs. Setting 
       Goals/Initiating Action
D-2: LOCUS OF DISCRETION (I)
Government vs. Private: How and Where will Abatement
       Occur?
D-3: DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS
Government vs. Private: Who Pays for Abatement and
       Environmental Damages?
D-4: PRICE VS. QUANTITY
D-5: INPUTS VS. OUTPUTS AND DEGREE OF CORRELATION
D-6: LOCUS OF DISCRETION (II)—INTERTEMPORAL FLEXIBILITY
Government vs. Private: When will Abatement Occur?
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Externalities are not the only market failure that can contribute
to excess pollution, however.  Information-related market failures
also contribute to environmental degradation when the information
does not exist, is not disseminated, or cannot be used because deci-
sion-makers do not have the requisite skills.113  When the government
identifies problems related to information, it may choose to intervene
in the market by, for example, developing education programs, un-
dertaking research at government facilities, giving grants to schools,
or requiring firms to inform the public about emissions.114
Two points are pertinent.  First, when the problems are informa-
tion-related, the government is addressing market failures related to
either asymmetric information or information as a public good.115
Second, when the government chooses to intervene in the market for
information, it must still decide which instruments to employ and how
much control to retain over the development and dissemination of the
information.  For these reasons the education, research, and technical
assistance approaches are not explicitly included in the taxonomy de-
scribed above.  It is not that the taxonomy in Figures 2 to 4 does not
accommodate information-based approaches but, in fact, just the op-
posite.  The new framework highlights the fact that the government
faces a parallel decision-making process of instrument choice whether
it is choosing instruments to correct externalities or to provide infor-
mation as a public good.
113. See Kenneth Richards, Economic Measures in a Global Climate Change Policy, U.S.
Concept Paper on Economic (Market) Measures 1-2 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (portions of this manuscript incorporated into INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES 236-237 (1991)).
114. For a discussion of the effectiveness of requiring firms to inform the public about emis-
sions, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environmentalism, 48 KAN. L. REV. 1, 14-16
(2000).
115. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 83-84 (3d ed. 2000).  For
a concise discussion of information and public policy, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 113-14 (1988).  Private contracts could, in theory, provide effi-
cient levels of information, as suggested by the Coase Theorem. See id. at 113.  However, given
the presence of third-party externalities and transaction costs, an efficient outcome is unlikely.
See id.  The government may be able to improve welfare by, for example, subsidizing research
and product testing, producing information that has a high fixed cost of development but rela-
tively low cost of dissemination.  Because, in the area of environmental protection, one person’s
use of information generally does not diminish another citizen’s capacity to also use that infor-
mation, research and testing have public good characteristics.  Similarly, in the presence of
asymmetric information about the risks, safety, or efficiency of a product, the government may
improve social welfare by requiring labeling or some other mechanism of disseminating infor-
mation.
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h.  Special Cases
Voluntary Programs
Table 1 summarizes the several dimensions for differentiating
among policy instruments.  Three of the studies included in Table A2
list voluntary programs or informal regulation as separate policy in-
struments, yet Figures 2 to 4 do not explicitly include this approach.
While it might be tempting to insert an additional dimension into Ta-
ble 1 for voluntary participation, that is not necessary.  To understand
how voluntary approaches fit in the new framework it is necessary
first to understand the role of government in voluntary programs and
informal regulation.
The recent instrument choice literature identifies two major
categories of voluntary programs.  The first, described by Blackman
and Harrington, involves “pressure exerted on polluters by private-
sector groups such as community organizations, environmental advo-
cacy groups, and trade unions.”116  This pressure can take the form of
social pressure, threats of adverse publicity, political pressure, and
moral suasion.  This process of private-sector negotiation is actually a
form of bargaining in which private organizations threaten to exercise
their speech and voting rights if the targeted polluting party does not
reduce emissions.  The government may have assigned, either implic-
itly or explicitly, the right to pollute to the polluter.  Nonetheless, the
polluter could find it expedient to capitulate to some private sector
demands rather than bear the cost of having a community organiza-
tion exercise its full range of speech and voting rights.117  Thus, infor-
mal regulation, as defined by Blackman and Harrington, is a special
case of the property rights approach on the left-hand side of Figure 2.
The second major category of voluntary programs includes gov-
ernment-initiated “actions which form part of government policy to
meet [environmental] policy objectives, and are based on a joint un-
dertaking between government and industry or national and local
authorities.”118  The government induces cooperation through appeal
to the self-interest of program participants.119  Often, for example, the
116. BLACKMAN & HARRINGTON, supra note 45, at 7.
117. For a recent analysis of whether operators of facilities identified in EPA’s Toxic Re-
lease Inventory undertake greater emission reductions when exposed to more politically active
local citizens, see James T. Hamilton, Exercising Property Rights to Pollute: Do Cancer Risks
and Politics Affect Plant Emissions Reductions?, 18 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 105 (1999).
118. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, VOLUNTARY ACTIONS FOR ENERGY-RELATED
CO2 ABATEMENT 27 (1997).
119. See Mark Storey et al., Voluntary Agreements with Industry 3 (Apr. 1997) (unpub-
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government provides technical assistance to help firms improve their
energy efficiency and reduce their costs, as in the case of the U.S.
EPA’s Green Lights Program.120  Alternatively, companies may par-
ticipate because they receive a government stamp of approval, as in
the case of the EPA Energy Star Program,121 or executive branch
goodwill and political access, as in the case of the U.S. Department of
Energy’s (DOE) Climate Challenge program.122  In other programs,
such as the DOE 1605(b) voluntary reporting program for green-
house gases, companies volunteer in the “shadow of regulation.”123
That is, there is an implicit threat by the government to use mandates
if industry does not produce suitable environmental results voluntar-
ily.124
While the motivations for firms voluntarily to undertake envi-
ronmental protection measures are complex,125 the important fact is
that the government is inducing participation not with distinct volun-
tary program instruments, but by application of standard instruments
drawn from Figure 3.  The government often uses contracts or inter-
nal government production to develop and disseminate technical in-
lished manuscript, on file with author); Jeffrey Dowd & Gale A. Boyd, A Typology of Volun-
tary Agreements Used in Energy and Environmental Policy 4 (Jan. 1998) (unpublished draft
prepared for the Office of Pol’y & Int’l Aff., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, on file with author).
120. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Partnership Benefits (last modified Aug. 1, 2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/buildings/esbhome/benefits/benefits.html>.
121. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Energy Star—The Symbol of Energy Efficiency (last
modified May 23. 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/energystar/>.
122. See Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Network (EREN) & U.S. Dep’t of En-
ergy, Climate Challenge: DOE’s Energy Partnerships for a Strong Economy (last modified July
31, 2000) <http://www.eren.doe.gov/climatechallenge/>.
123. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases under Section
1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992: General Guidelines (last modified Dec. 17, 1997)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/1605b.html>.  It would be an informative exercise to consider
the parallels among “volunteering in the shadow of regulation,” as considered here, “bargaining
in the shadow of the law” (Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225
(1982)), and “bargaining in the shadow of power” (Robert Powell, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Power, 15 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 255, 255 (1996)).
124. See Kathleen Segerson & Thomas J. Miceli, Voluntary Approaches to Environmental
Protection: The Role of Legislative Threats 4 (Mar. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
125. See, e.g., Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, An Experiment in Voluntary Environ-
mental Regulation: Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 271,
275-84 (1995) [hereinafter Arora & Cason, Voluntary Environmental Regulation]; Seema Arora
& Timothy N. Cason, Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Under-
standing Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 72 LAND ECON. 413, 423-30 (1996) [hereinafter
Arora & Cason, Why Do Firms Voluneer?].
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formation and assistance that demonstrates the cost-effectiveness of
energy efficiency investments.  For example, through the USDA agri-
cultural extension program, the government provides technical assis-
tance and seedlings to encourage landowners to plant forest stands.
This is an application of the government production instrument.  The
“shadow of regulation” is nothing more than the threat to exercise
coercive instruments from the middle and bottom of Figure 3 if indus-
try does not voluntarily abate pollution.  Thus, voluntary programs
and informal regulation are best understood not as new and separate
instruments, but as specific applications of the instruments described
in Figures 2 to 4.
Hybrid Systems
The new framework also suggests that some schemes that are
treated as separate instruments by studies in Table A2 are actually
combinations of instruments from the coercive and enterprise modes.
The most obvious of these is the deposit-refund system, which com-
bines a tax on the use or removal of potentially polluting materials,
such as bottles, motor oil, and hazardous materials, with a subsidy for
their return and proper disposal.  Similarly, the charge-subsidy system
described by Pezzey combines a tax on a firm’s emissions above a cer-
tain baseline with a subsidy for reduction below that baseline, where
the tax and subsidy rates per unit of emissions are equal.126  Roberts
and Spence describe a similar system of subsidies and penalties, but
combine that with a system of tradable permits to address the uncer-
tainty that may hamper the use of price-based or quantity-based in-
struments individually.127  In that system the subsidy and charge rates
are not equal.
Some systems, parading under the banner of one instrument, are
actually hybrids of other instruments.  For example, in some cases
that have been described as trading, the arrangement is actually a
form of direct government production.  In the case of the Tar-Pamlico
point-nonpoint source trading program in North Carolina, point
source polluters can acquire additional emissions allowances by trad-
ing for nonpoint source offsets.128  However, the state government is
the sole supplier of the nonpoint source offsets that create the addi-
126. See Pezzey, Symmetry, supra note 70, at 985-986.
127. See Roberts & Spence, supra note 84, at 194.
128. See Esther Bartfield, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost
Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 80, 86-87 (1993).
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tional allowances, and those allowances are sold at a fixed price.129
Hence, the system is actually a tax on point source emissions above a
given baseline with the tax earmarked for nonpoint source controls
undertaken through government production.
IV.  THE CONSTRAINED COST-MINIMIZATION PROBLEM
The new taxonomy of environmental policy instruments differen-
tiates instruments on the basis of who bears the cost of pollution
abatement and environmental damage (D-3) and who controls deci-
sions about production of abatement services (D-2).  However the
government chooses to distribute costs, it must decide whether it will
retain control over the production of emissions abatement through
direct government production and command-and-control instru-
ments, or, alternatively, whether it should allow private firms discre-
tion with respect to how the emissions reductions are made.  The de-
cision is analogous to a private firm’s “make-or-buy” decision about
whether to produce goods and services directly or to contract with
other firms for production.  In the environmental instrument choice
literature, which concentrates primarily on minimizing production
costs, the decision is generally cast as a choice between incentive-
based instruments and command-and-control regulation, with a
strong bias toward the former.
The preceding discussion of evaluation criteria suggests that in
choosing among the various instruments, an efficiency-seeking gov-
ernment minimizes the sum of three costs: production costs (PC), im-
plementation costs (IC), and public finance costs (TX), subject to
various constraints.130  The discussion in this section will proceed as
follows.  First, it will discuss how production costs vary among in-
struments, drawing primarily on the environmental policy and trans-
action cost economics literatures.  Second, it will examine implemen-
tation costs, drawing heavily on New Institutional Economics to
explain the role of intermediate instruments in the interior of Figure
3.  Third, it will employ the growing literature on public finance and
instrument choice (also known in the environmental policy context as
the “double dividend” literature) to explore the role of public finance
impacts on the relative costs of various instruments.  Finally, the sec-
tion finishes with a brief consideration of the constraints on the opti-
mization problem.
129. See id.
130. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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A.  Abatement Production Costs:  Lessons from Environmental
Economics
Production costs represent the direct costs of pollution abate-
ment—the capital, training, operation, maintenance and private man-
agement costs.  Because the choice of instruments influences which
technologies are chosen for emissions control and how well those
technologies are implemented, production costs will vary among the
instruments.  While command-and-control regulation and govern-
ment production rely upon the government’s ability to identify cost-
effective technological options for pollution abatement, the incentive-
based instruments shift that responsibility to private-sector parties.131
The consequence is that with incentive-based instruments, private
parties will search for technologies and practices that are well suited
to their specific applications and will adjust the level of control of
pollutants to reflect the price signals of the market.  In addition, sta-
ble incentive-based instruments induce dynamic cost-effectiveness by
promoting technological innovation to minimize costs over the long
run.132
The fact that incentive-based mechanisms tend to lower produc-
tion costs relative to command-and-control or hierarchical mecha-
nisms is recognized in both the environmental instrument choice lit-
erature133 and the transaction cost/contracting literature.134  However,
the environmental policy literature seldom acknowledges that the
relative advantage of the incentive-based instruments is situation-
specific, dependent in part upon the lack of a clearly identifiable best
technology or practice for a given application across all abaters.
Where the range of technology options is wide, or the applications are
varied, vesting discretion in private parties will yield the greatest ad-
131. This assumes the incentive-based instruments are based on actual output or some rea-
sonable proxy for output.
132. See Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological
Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247, 257 (1989); Marin, supra note
84, at 297.
133. See, e.g., Fisher at al., supra note 28, at 413, 415; Robert Hahn & Robert Stavins, Trad-
ing in Greenhouse Permits: A Critical Examination of Design and Implementation Issues 17
(Mar. 18, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Hahn & Stavins,
Trading in Greenhouse Permits]; HAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN, supra note 3, at
12-13.
134. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 76 (stating that outside contracting lowers
production costs ("maintains high powered incentives") relative to hierarchical mechanisms
("vertical integration")); O’LEARY ET AL., supra note 73, at 287 ("Policymakers often find that
contracts and grants are a less expensive way to deliver goods and services than providing them
through government agencies").
RICHARDS_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:57 AM
256 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:221
vantages.  For example, Hahn and Stavins point out that in the case of
air pollution, “the cost of controlling a unit of a given pollutant may
vary by a factor of 100 or more among sources.”135  Conversely, if the
technology of choice is easily identified and uniform across applica-
tions, the advantage of incentive-based instruments is not as great.
Similarly, if the nature of the technology is such that there are not
likely to be major cost-reducing innovations, then the relative advan-
tages of incentive-based instruments are reduced.136  However, the in-
centive-based instrument will virtually always lead to lower abate-
ment costs than the hierarchical instruments.  It is only the relative
advantage that declines when there is a narrow range of technology
options and applications.
B.  Implementation Costs:  Lessons from New Institutional Economics
If incentive-based instruments virtually always minimize the costs
of producing abatement services, why would a cost minimizing gov-
ernment ever select the hierarchical approaches?  Perhaps because
the implementation costs of incentive-based instruments can, under
certain circumstances, threaten to offset their production cost advan-
tages.  The transaction cost economics literature recognizes two cate-
gories of transaction costs: measurement costs and governance
costs.137  Measurement costs refer to the resources dedicated to moni-
135. Hahn & Stavins, Trading in Greenhouse Permits, supra note 133, at 5.
136. Mendelsohn addresses an issue that is similar to heterogeneous cost functions across
firms, that of heterogeneous damages due to spatial variations of the pollutants. See Robert
Mendelsohn, Regulating Heterogeneous Emissions, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 301 (1986).
137. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 26-29 (describing transaction cost economics as
having two branches: a measurement branch and a governance branch).  This article employs
the language and conceptual framework of Williamsonian transaction cost economics, as op-
posed to the different terminology used by North and others. Compare id. with DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 39 (1981) ("The resource costs de-
voted to compliance differ with alternative forms of organized economic activity.  These com-
pliance costs consist of the costs of measurement in alternative organizational forms and the
costs of enforcing an agreement.") [hereinafter NORTH, STRUCTURE & CHANGE], and
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 27 (1990) ("The costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting,
which consists of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of
protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements.  These measurement and enforcement
costs are the sources of social, political, and economic institutions.") [hereinafter NORTH,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE], and North, Institutional Economics, supra note 23, at 5
("[T]ransaction costs are only two things: (1) the costs of measuring the dimensions of whatever
it is that is being produced or exchanged and (2) the costs of enforcement.").  North has re-
ferred to his brand of transaction cost economics as the "University of Washington approach"
when distinguishing his approach from that of Williamson. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE,
supra, at 27 n.1.
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toring and evaluating performance.138  These costs have been fre-
quently addressed in the environmental economics literature.139  Gov-
ernance costs are the costs of establishing and maintaining mecha-
nisms to resolve conflict and adapt to changes.140  These are seldom
mentioned in the environmental policy literature.  To complete the
list of implementation costs, it is necessary to include the costs of ini-
tially designing the program, gathering the needed information, and
negotiating program parameters with affected parties.
One conclusion of the transaction cost literature is that develop-
ing mechanisms under which control of production decisions is shared
by parties to the transaction is often more efficient than vesting all
control in only one of the parties.141  These types of discretion-sharing
arrangements are frequently observed when the government acts in
its enterprise mode.142  After discussing measurement and governance
costs, this section explores ways in which intermediate, discretion-
sharing mechanisms might be also employed in the coercive mode.
1.  Measurement Costs
The environmental instrument choice literature has largely con-
centrated its treatment of measurement costs on issues related to
monitoring known sources of emissions and relating those sources to
environmental impacts or ambient pollution concentrations.143  Gen-
erally, where private parties have significant discretion with respect to
138. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 29.
139. The differential cost of monitoring is an important factor driving choices among the
various approaches.  Blackman and Harrington observe that the information requirements asso-
ciated with implementing incentive-based approaches based on emissions levels suggest that
some developing countries may be better advised to use indirect approaches that sacrifice some
ostensible efficiency gains in favor of lower monitoring costs. See BLACKMAN & HARRINGTON,
supra note 45, at 24.  For more on monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations,
see Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 243, 262-70 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990); CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL
ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 29-44, 52-62, 82-86 (1986).
140. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 18-32.
141. See id. at 129 ("The study of transaction cost economizing entails an examination of
alternative ways by which to govern exchange interfaces.  Firms, markets, and mixed modes are
recognized as alternative instruments of governance." (emphasis added)).
142. See David E.M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privitization, Information and Incen-
tives, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 567, 579-80 (1986).
143. See, e.g., Marc J. Roberts & Susan O. Farrell, The Political Economy of Implementa-
tion: The Clean Air Act and Stationary Sources, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR
POLLUTION 152, 163-174 (Ann F. Friedlaender ed., 1978); see generally RUSSELL ET AL., supra
note 139; Anastasios Xepapadeas, Enviromental Policy Under Imperfect Information: Incentives
and Moral Hazard, 20 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 113 (1991); Pinaki Bose, Anticipatory Com-
pliance and Effective Regulatory Activity, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 151 (1995).
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how to abate emissions, accurate quantitative assessments of per-
formance are particularly important to the government.  That is, the
amount of information the government needs to monitor perform-
ance is often positively related to the level of discretion the govern-
ment vests in the private party.  In some cases, such as controlling
carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion, monitoring inputs (i.e.,
fuel consumption) provides an inexpensive and acceptably accurate
proxy for performance.144  In many cases, however, there simply are
no reliable alternatives to direct measurement of the pollutant.145  In
cases where the costs of monitoring quantities of output are high rela-
tive to the costs of observing practices, the government may choose to
limit the discretion granted to private parties, thereby raising produc-
tion costs but containing measurement costs. To the extent that in-
creased discretion for private parties decreases production costs, a
tradeoff arises between production and measurement costs.
2.  Governance Costs
If measurement costs deal with the government’s relation to the
physical changes it seeks, then governance costs are associated with
the government’s relation with the parties whose behavior it seeks to
change.  Governance costs refer to those costs associated with the
mechanisms that are established to resolve conflicts, provide neces-
sary guarantees, and adapt to changes.
The instrument choice literature, concentrating on the coercive
mode, has largely examined the transaction costs associated with
monitoring and enforcement.146  The emphasis on litigation-based
resolution of conflict, however, means that these environmental pol-
icy studies have not adequately addressed the tension among the wel-
fare-seeking government’s goals of (1) encouraging private sector in-
vestment in the specialized assets that most cost-effectively abate
pollution, (2) providing the private sector the flexibility and discretion
it needs to develop specialized, high-efficiency technologies, and (3)
providing the government the flexibility to adapt the program in re-
sponse to changes in knowledge, technology, states of the world, and
preferences.  The tension among these goals is, however, addressed in
144. See U.S. DOE, REPORTING METHODOLOGIES, supra note 102, at 1.25; see generally
Helfand, supra note 104.
145. Sulfur dioxide trading, for example, arguably had to await the availability of continuous
emissions monitoring (CEM) at reasonable cost. See Nancy Kete, The Politics of Markets: The
Acid Rain Control Policy in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 242-43 (1992) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with author).
146. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
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the treatment of governance costs by the New Institutional Econom-
ics literature.147
Transaction costs become important only when the parties to a
transaction148 and the transaction itself both exhibit certain character-
istics (see Table 2).149  The behavioral assumptions about parties to a
transaction that motivate the analysis of transaction costs are
bounded rationality and opportunism.150  Bounded rationality refers to
the cognitive limits of the parties—the mind as a scarce resource.151  If
parties could identify and negotiate through every possible contin-
gency to a transaction—a possibility assumed by classical contract
doctrine,152 then the issues addressed by transaction cost economics
would disappear.153  However, given bounded rationality, parties in-
volved in a transaction cannot conceive of all possible contingencies
147. See Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 142, at 576-80.
148. In the discussion that follows, the term “transaction” is used in its broadest sense—
namely, to describe a transaction between parties.  Not all “transactions” occur between entirely
willing parties of equal power, and herein, it will be assumed only that dealings take place be-
tween parties who each exercise some influence over how the transaction is executed and its
goal met.  Thus, an arrangement made between a regulatory government agency and a polluting
firm fits squarely within the definition established here for a “transaction.”
149. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 44-61.
150. See id. at 45-49; Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions and Development: A View
from the Bottom, in A NOT-SO-DISMAL SCIENCE: A BROADER VIEW OF ECONOMIES AND
SOCIETIES 92, 96 (Mancur Olsen & Satu Kähkönen eds., 2000) [hereinafter Williamson, A View
from the Bottom].
151. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 45, 46 n.6.
152. See id. at 69.
153. See id. at 50 ("Of special importance is that transaction cost economics pairs a semi-
strong form of cognitive competence (bounded rationality) with a strong motivational assump-
tion (opportunism).  Without both, the major problems of economic organization [addressed by
transaction cost economics] would vanish or be vastly transformed.").
TABLE 2: ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING TRANSACTION
COST ECONOMICS
1. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE PARTIES:
a. Bounded Rationality
b. Opportunistic Behavior
2. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE TRANSACTION:
a. Asset Specificity
b. Uncertainty
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and address them in a comprehensive agreement.154  The more com-
plex is the transaction, the more important is the role of bounded ra-
tionality.  This assumption does not imply that parties are irrational
or nonrational.  Rather they intend to act with rationality but are
limited in cognitive capacity.155  Thus, bounded rationality does not
question parties’ rationality, but rather their omniscience.
The second behavioral assumption relates to what Williamson
refers to as the parties’ “self-interest orientation.”156  The strongest
form of self-interest, opportunism (defined as self-interest coupled
with guile), underlies transaction cost analysis.157  Opportunism goes
beyond simple self-interest seeking, which is the assumption that par-
ties will attempt to gather the wealth and advantages that their skills
and assets afford them but will always act openly and honestly.158  Op-
portunism suggests that parties will also “mislead, distort, disguise,
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”159 where it is to their advantage to do
so.160
The choice of optimal governance structure also depends upon
the nature of the transaction itself.  Two important characteristics of
transactions are the degree of asset specificity and the level of uncer-
tainty.161  Asset specificity refers to the extent to which the resources
used to produce the object of the transaction are idiosyncratic to the
transaction.162  In Williamson’s words,
[A]sset specificity refers to durable investments that are under-
154. See id. at 46 ("Comprehensive contracting is not a realistic organizational alternative
when provision for bounded rationality is made.").
155. See id. at 45 ("[A]ctors are assumed to be ’intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.’"
(quoting Herbert Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political
Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 303 (1985))); Williamson, A View from the Bottom, supra
note 150, at 96 (quoting same passage).
156. WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 47.
157. See id. ("By opportunism I mean self-interest seeking with guile.  This includes but is
scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating.  Opportunism more
often involves subtle forms of deceit.").  See also POSNER, supra note 69, at 103 (describing op-
portunism as “trying to take advantage of the vulnerabilities created by the sequential character
of contractual performance.”); NORTH, STRUCTURE & CHANGE, supra note 137, at 36 (de-
scribing opportunism as "the ability of one party to an exchange to benefit at the expense of the
other party by violating the agreement in his or her post-contractual behavior").
158. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 49.
159. Id. at 47.
160. Adverse selection and moral hazard are two specific manifestations of the presence of
opportunistic behavior. See id.
161. See id. at 52, 56.
162. Williamson identifies four categories of asset specificity: site specificity, physical asset
specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets. See id. at 55.
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taken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of
which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by al-
ternative users should the original transaction be prematurely ter-
minated . . . .163
While asset specificity is the most important characteristic of the
transaction for this type of analysis, uncertainty is also important.164
When a transaction involves uncertainty and the parties are subject to
bounded rationality, adaptability of the transaction is crucial.165  If
there is no uncertainty in the future, or uncertainty exists but all pos-
sible outcomes can be anticipated, a detailed agreement or set of rules
could cover all contingencies.166  Or, if there is no opportunism, a gen-
eral rule stating how sharing arrangements for joint gains from new
opportunities could lead to efficient actions.  However, the combina-
tion of bounded rationality and opportunism in the presence of uncer-
tainty means that it is unlikely that parties will easily adapt to, and
exploit opportunities arising from unexpected changes in the world.
Uncertainty contributes a central explanation for the imprecise
nature of the transaction agreement.  Williamson recognizes both
state-contingent uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty.167  While the
former arises from changes in the state of the world, the latter relates
to either the limits of communication (non-strategic) or the potential
for parties to a transaction to use information to their advantage
(strategic).168  Williamson is primarily concerned with uncertainty
arising from strategic behavior.169  For transaction cost analysis to be
of interest, it is not necessary that parties actually behave strategi-
cally, but only that they might.170  Note, however, that behavioral un-
certainty is only of interest in the case where there is also the poten-
tial for exogenous disturbances requiring adaptation, i.e., state-
contingent uncertainty.171
The factors that are key to the analysis of transaction costs—
bounded rationality and opportunism on the part of the parties and
asset specificity and uncertainty in the transaction—are equally
163. Id.
164. See id. at 56-57.
165. See id. at 57.
166. See id. at 59.
167. See id. at 57-58.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 58.
170. See id at 58-59.
171. See id. at 59.
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relevant to pollution abatement programs.172  If the regulator and
regulated industries fully shared information, including information
regarding uncertainty about the knowledge, technology, state of the
world and regulatory preferences, they could ascertain efficient in-
vestments in emissions-reducing technology and agree to share risks
in a scheme to maximize net social benefits.  This arrangement would
not only lead to the choice of the most cost-effective technologies
given current emission targets, but also would provide private parties
appropriate incentives to modify investment strategies to account for
the potential for efficiency-enhancing changes in targets.
However, there are two problems with this scenario.  First, of
course, it assumes a level of information exchange inconsistent with
bounded rationality.  Second, the scenario ignores the role of oppor-
tunistic behavior.  The fact that industry withholds information in the
regulatory process is well documented.173  More pernicious, perhaps, is
the potential for government opportunistic behavior once private
firms have invested in specialized assets.  Private firms can and should
incorporate legitimate regulatory uncertainty in their investment de-
cisions.  This lowers the cost of efficiency-enhancing adaptive changes
in the goals of government programs.  However, social welfare de-
creases when investors alter their investments for fear of opportunis-
tic behavior by the regulator.  Changes in the direction of the regula-
tion should be based on reasonably well-defined economic and
scientific criteria, not government opportunism.  In EPA’s emission
trading program, for example, fear of expropriation likely impeded
trading and, by implication, cost-effective investment.174  Private firms
may have recognized that they were revealing new cost information
when they undertook inter-firm trades of emissions credits.175  This in-
vited confiscation by state regulators who were required to meet re-
gional air quality standards.176  The ambiguity about the treatment of
172. See Williamson, A View from the Bottom, supra note 150, at 96 (emphasis added):
The two behavioral assumptions out of which transaction cost economics
works are (1) bounded rationality (on which account all complex contracts
are unavoidably incomplete) and (2) opportunism (on which account mere
promise unsupported by credible commitments poses contractual hazards).
These behavioral assumptions apply systematically to all forms of organiza-
tion, which is to say that economic actors in the private sector and public sec-
tor are described as being alike.
173. See, e.g., Dennis A. Yao, Strategic Responses to Automobile Emissions Control: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis, 15 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 419, 420-421 (1988).
174. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 108, at 378-79 (referring to the fear of confiscation as a
transaction cost).
175. See id. at 379.
176. Id.
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tradable allowances in the regulatory process simply aggravated in-
vestor fears.177
How can the government address the firms’ concerns about op-
portunistic behavior that might prevent them from investing in cost-
effective, specialized pollution abatement activities?  First, the gov-
ernment could seek mechanisms to make credible commitments
against opportunistic behavior.178  But effective commitments can be
costly and at times infeasible.179  Alternatively, the government may
adopt one of the hierarchical modes on the right-hand side of Figure 2
that do not provide private firms with discretion over the investment
decisions.  In the context of private transactions involving both idio-
syncratic (specialized) investments and uncertainty, Williamson notes
the advantages of hierarchical arrangements:
Incentives for trading weaken as transactions become progressively
more idiosyncratic . . . . The choice of mode then turns entirely on
which mode has superior adaptive properties . . . .  The advantage
of vertical integration is that adaptations can be made in a sequen-
tial way without the need to consult, complete, or revise interfirm
agreements.180
Just as private transactions may rely on hierarchical arrange-
ments to provide adaptability in the presence of uncertainty, the gov-
ernment may want to employ government production or direct regu-
lation if it anticipates the need to adapt its environmental programs to
changes in information or changes in goals.  This adaptability comes
at a price, however.  The hierarchical governance approach sacrifices
the “high-powered incentives” present in the other governance struc-
tures to gain the adaptability of internal control.
177. In a morphologically similar setting related to command-and-control regulation of
automobiles, Yao observes that when EPA announces a new standard to take effect at a future
date, industry may under-invest in developing new technology, hoping to convince the govern-
ment agency that the regulation is more costly than expected. See Yao, supra note 173, at 433-
435.  Yao observes in this setting that “[i]f EPA could be persuasive in demonstrating its inabil-
ity to learn . . . society would benefit.” Id. at 433.
178. See Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 142, at 574; WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 168.
179. See discussion infra Part IV.D.3 (concerning prohibitions on legislative entrenchment
and alternative mechanisms for credible commitment). On difficulties related to government
precommitment to transition relief in the case of changes in the tax law, see also Logue, supra
note 75, at 1153-63.
180. WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 78.  When Williamson refers to “organizing mode,” he
is distinguishing between “bilateral structures where the autonomy of the parties is maintained
and unified structures, where the transaction is removed from the market and organized with . . .
an authority relation (vertical integration).” Id. at 75-76.  Hence, Williamson differentiates be-
tween decentralized discretion and hierarchical control.  Do not confuse this with the way the
term “mode” is used in this article—namely, as a means to distinguish between the “enterprise
mode” and the “coercive mode.”
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The choice of governance structure may also have a dynamic
element if the level of uncertainty can be reduced through experi-
ence.  As Williamson notes,
To the extent that uncertainty decreases as an industry matures,
which is the usual case, the benefits that accrue to internal organi-
zation (vertical integration) presumably decline.  Accordingly,
greater reliance on market procurement is commonly feasible for
transactions of recurrent trading in mature industries.181
Similarly, if the government pursues a new environmental strat-
egy, such as carbon sequestration in forests,182 it may be that in the
early stages of implementation, uncertainty and the inability to pro-
vide credible commitments against opportunistic behavior will favor
hierarchical arrangements.  With experience and decreased uncer-
tainty, it may be possible to shift toward the incentive-based instru-
ments.
Sappington and Stiglitz argue that the most important difference
between private and public provision of goods and services is the
transaction costs associated with intervention by the government in
the production activities.183  Unlike private production, public provi-
sion leaves the government with residual rights to intervene.184  In
situations of high uncertainty this is an important option.185
In choosing between public and private control, it is important to
consider both the expected benefits and costs of intervention, and the
probability that intervention will occur.  Two important elements of
this calculation are the complexity of the task under consideration
and the need for rapid adaptation to unforeseen contingencies.  When
the task is particularly novel and complex, unforeseen contingencies
are more likely to arise.  And if rapid adaptation to these events is
181. Id. at 80.
182. Carbon sequestration refers to the strategy of reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide
levels by adopting programs to increase biomass cover, particularly forests. See generally
ROBERT J. MOULTON & KENNETH R. RICHARDS, FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GEN.
TECHNICAL REP. NO. WO-58, COSTS OF SEQUESTERING CARBON THROUGH TREE PLANTING
AND FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1990).
183. See Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 142, at 568, 580-81.
184. See id. at 568.
185. Cf. O’LEARY ET AL., supra note 73, at 288-89 (suggesting that government may adopt a
contract or privatization approach to enhance flexibility because “[i]n some circumstances,
starting up new programs is easier for a contractor or grantee than for a government bureauc-
racy encumbered by mandated standard operating procedures, demanding interest groups, and
bureaucratic red tape.”)  The Superfund program, for example, was established with heavy reli-
ance on contractors, because Congress and EPA assumed contracting would enable EPA to get
the program started faster than if the agency had to first develop internal structure and exper-
tise. See OTA, ASSESSING SUPERFUND, supra note 74, at 1-4.
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crucial (as in the case of national defense, for example), ease of inter-
vention to redirect activities and limit the duration of renegotiation
may be relatively important; under such circumstances, government
provision is more likely to be the preferred method.
Neither De Alessi nor Sappington and Stiglitz consider the use of
government enterprise as a tool to control opportunistic behavior by
a government,186 although this may be as important as the govern-
ment’s ease of intervention.
The normative conclusion based on the transaction cost eco-
nomics literature is that allocating more discretion to private parties
in the environmental protection process should be favored when in-
novation is important, the goal is well defined, specialized invest-
ments are minimal, and outputs can be measured or inputs are good
proxies for output.  Government production should be favored when
asset specificity is high, the government is unable to credibly commit
not to behave opportunistically, uncertainty is high, goals are ill-
defined or changeable, and measurement is particularly costly.
3.  Intermediate Instruments
As demonstrated by the lists of tools in Table A2, the policy lit-
erature commonly depicts the instrument choice problem as dis-
crete—i.e., “choose this or that.”  New Institutional Economics, how-
ever, does not necessarily lead to a choice of one or the other—pure
output-based contract or pure internal production.187  The transaction
cost economics literature recognizes the existence of a range of in-
struments between classical contracts/subsidies and pure government
production.  In the interior of that range the government and private
firms share control over production decisions (Figure 3).  Several
structures can be built into a contract or subsidy to create hierarchical
elements while avoiding the need for the government to undertake
the production activity directly.  The elements include:
(a) command structures and authority systems, (b) incentive sys-
tems, supporting authority systems and also guiding the use of a
contractor’s discretion by a structure of differential rewards par-
tially isolated from the market, (c) standard operating procedures,
which describe routines that involve actions by both contractors
186. See De Alessi, supra note 30; Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 142.  De Alessi does
discuss the use of government enterprise as a means of escaping problems related to private
contractors appropriating assets.  He states that “[a]s the cost of reducing the range for such op-
portunistic behavior increases, more of these activities will be vertically integrated within gov-
ernment.” De Alessi, supra note 30, at 202.
187. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 129.
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and clients, (d) dispute resolution procedures, partially isolated
from the court system and the market, and (e) pricing of variations
in performance partially isolated from the market, including espe-
cially pricing based on contractor costs.188
Authority systems primarily establish the means for legitimating
directions for changes and for clarifying the distribution of costs and
risks associated with the changes.189  In the extreme, however, author-
ity systems become approval systems, slipping into supervi-
sory/monitoring functions.  When government supervision of contract
execution becomes too cumbersome, there is the serious possibility of
losing the “high-powered” incentives that constitute the primary ad-
vantage of contract or subsidy arrangements with private parties.190
“Aside from the extra work involved in creating a document for ap-
proval for each intermediate decision, such a fine net of approvals
strains out any discretion or originality that the contractors’ engineers
might have been afflicted with.”191
While the authority system recognizes that contractual changes
may be required, the incentive systems and standard operating proce-
dures built into contracts serve to clarify how performance will be
evaluated and the specific expectations of the parties.  The dispute
resolution procedure, often involving an arbitrator, allows perform-
ance to continue even as disagreements are settled.  Thus, perform-
ance can be more rapidly redirected.  Finally, the pricing of variations
(change orders in the language of construction contracting) clarifies
for the client the cost of changing specifications, allowing efficient ad-
aptation and reducing the potential for conflict.
These mechanisms allow contractual adaptation to uncertainty.
They develop governance mechanisms that lie somewhere between
classical contracts and pure hierarchy.  For example, Stinchcombe es-
timates that in large construction projects, typically 20 percent of the
work is done under hierarchical change orders.192  Eighty percent of
the work done in R&D contracts for weapons is done in a hierarchical
mode.193
These specialized governance mechanisms are costly, however,
and may be less attractive than either incentive-based contracts,
188. Stinchcombe, supra note 91, at 156.
189. See id. at 156-157.
190. WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 140.
191. Stinchcombe, supra note 91, at 157-158.
192. See id. at 167.
193. See id.
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which are unable to induce investment in highly specialized assets, or
government production, which sacrifices desirable incentive charac-
teristics.  The art of choosing and designing a governance mechanism
for transactions is to recognize when the production cost benefits as-
sociated with incentive-based governance are so seriously eroded that
the considerable costs of developing nonstandard mechanisms are no
longer justified.  The goal is to find the arrangement that minimizes
the sum of production and implementation costs.  These intermediate
mechanisms can be designed to overcome potential difficulties related
to measurement, asset specificity, and uncertainty/adaptability, but
their benefits must be weighed against their considerable costs.194
The same opportunities and same caveats can be applied to the
coercive instruments, such as taxes, marketable allowances, and
command-and-control regulation.  In some applications, perform-
ance-based standards provide private firms with more discretion
(lower production costs) than technology-based command-and-
control standards, without introducing unreasonable monitoring,
measurement and governance (implementation) costs.  Arguably, re-
quirements of government approval of individual trades in the case of
marketable allowances for air emissions and nonpoint source water
pollution programs have been intended to reduce monitoring and
measurement costs while retaining the attractive attributes of an in-
centive-based system.  The results may have been perverse, however,
nearly eliminating the incentive to trade while introducing greater
monitoring costs.
C.  Revenue-Raising Costs:  Lessons from Public Economics
The previous section explored the tradeoff between production
costs and implementation costs in environmental policy instrument
choice.  For many standard applications, incentive-based instruments
minimize both types of costs.  However, for some more complex ap-
plications, such as carbon sequestration and nonpoint source pollu-
194. A related issue arises when the government is implementing a complex program such
as Superfund.  The government has attempted to contract out the actual testing and physical
cleanup work while retaining many of the decisions that require government authority or value
judgements. See OTA, ASSESSING SUPERFUND, supra note 74, at 4, 5.  However, these two roles
cannot be clearly delineated in a highly technical, complex, and socially volatile program.  The
matter is made more complex by the high attrition rate among government employees that
manage the contractors.  The salary differential between government managers and private con-
tractors induces civil servants with even modest experience to migrate to the private sector. See
id. at 6.  Thus, there is a “lack of development of internal EPA expertise, which results in poor
contract management and oversight.” Id.
RICHARDS_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:57 AM
268 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:221
tion abatement, the decision is not as clear.  While production costs
may be minimized by an incentive-based system, the implementation
costs might not.  This section examines the third cost component
listed in the cost-minimization function—public finance costs.
Taxes on labor, capital, consumption, and production drive a
wedge between the market price of resources and the marginal cost of
their production.195  This tends to distort production and consumption
decisions.196  The extent of the distortion depends upon the precise na-
ture of the tax and the characteristics of consumer preferences.197
Understanding the general equilibrium effects of distortionary taxes
is an important element of the study of public economics.198
Imposing a tax on pollutants will reduce the level of pollution,
assuming that the demand for emissions is not perfectly inelastic.199  It
has been further suggested that the efficiency of the tax system could
be improved by shifting part of the tax burden from productive fac-
tors, such as labor and capital, toward “public bads” such as pollu-
tion.200  While shifting taxes toward environmental charges may be
good public policy, it is unlikely to reduce distortions from public
revenue raising.201  This is because the burden of an environmental tax
ultimately rests on labor, even if it is imposed via a tax on pollution or
polluting goods.  Imposing the tax indirectly, via an emissions charge,
actually introduces additional distortions into the labor-leisure trade-
off decision and reduces social welfare.202  This is not to say that envi-
195. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 115, at 536 (labor), 649 (capital), 531-32 (consumption
and production).
196. See id. at 532.
197. See id. at 531-32.
198. See Robert A. Musgrave, A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1, 42 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985).
199. See STIGLITZ, supra note 115, at 224-27.
200. See ROBERT REPETTO ET AL., GREEN FEES: HOW A TAX SHIFT CAN WORK FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 1-12 (1992).  For an early discussion of the use of effluent
charges, see Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bower, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 237, 245-53 (1968).
201. See A. Lans Bovenberg & Ruud A. de Mooij, Environmental Levies and Distortionary
Taxation, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1085, 1085 (1994) ("[E]nvironmental taxes typically exacerbate,
rather than alleviate, preexisting tax distortions—even if revenues are employed to cut preex-
isting distortionary taxes."); LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND THE
“DOUBLE DIVIDEND:” A READER’S GUIDE 31 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No.
4896, 1994); A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Optimal Environmental Taxation in
the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 985, 994-95
(1996) [hereinafter Bovenberg & Goulder, Optional Environmental Taxation].
202. For a complete demonstration of how distortions are introduced into the labor-leisure
tradeoff by environmental taxes and how social welfare is reduced, see Bovenberg & de Mooij,
supra note 201, at 1087.
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ronmental taxes are poor public policy.  Rather, if taxes improve so-
cial welfare, it will likely be due to the value of the improved envi-
ronmental services, despite their impact on the public revenue-raising
system.
That said, if public policy mandates pollution abatement, how
should the requirement be implemented?  To answer this, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the distorting effect of the pollution reduction
on consumer demand and labor supply may be felt regardless of
whether the chosen instrument raises revenue or not.  The question
then shifts to one of comparing instruments for both distortionary ef-
fects on consumer demand and the potential to raise revenue and
thereby offset other distortionary taxes.
Terkla examined the “efficiency value” of taxes versus regula-
tions as environmental policy instruments.203  Because taxes on labor,
capital, consumption, and production all have distortionary effects on
prices, the act of government revenue raising has a significant social
cost.204  The extent of the distortion depends upon the effective tax
wedge and the demand and supply elasticities of the taxed commodity
(e.g., labor or capital).205  The range of estimates of the marginal wel-
fare cost of taxes runs from 10 to 300 percent,206 with the most com-
mon estimates in the 15 to 50 percent range.207  The high marginal cost
of public funds has serious implications for the choice of environ-
mental policy instruments.  For example, drawing on estimates avail-
able at the time of his study, Terkla found that in the United States
the marginal social cost of raising another dollar of revenue via the
labor income tax was 0.16 to 0.66 dollars.208  Thus, the marginal social
cost of government expenditures is 1.16 to 1.66 dollars per dollar
spent.  The marginal cost of raising revenue with a tax on corporate
income was estimated at 0.56 dollars per dollar of revenue.209  Terkla
found that the relative cost of reducing particulate and sulfur dioxide
203. See David Terkla, The Efficiency Value of Effluent Tax Revenues, 11 J. ENVTL. ECON.
& MGMT. 107, 108 (1984).
204. See STIGLITZ, supra note 115, at 531-32, 536, 649.
205. See id. at 531-32.
206. See Edgar K. Browning, On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation, 77 AM. ECON. REV.
11, 21 (1987).
207. See Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Wel-
fare Costs of Taxes in the United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128, 128 (1985); Charles Stuart,
Welfare Costs Per Dollar of Additional Tax Revenue in the United States, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
352, 358-60 (1984).
208. See Terkla, supra note 203, at 114.
209. See id.
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air pollutants in the United State via regulation rather than taxes bore
an additional social cost of up to $4.87 billion per year.210
Parry developed a general equilibrium analysis suggesting that
while regulation has all of the undesirable “tax interaction effects” of
an environmental tax, it provides none of the desirable “revenue-
recycling effects.”211  Thus, from a public finance point of view alone,
if emissions abatement is imposed, it should be done through one of
the revenue-raising mechanisms (taxes or auctioned allowances). 212
Bovenberg and Goulder developed a more formal general equilib-
rium model that incorporated both capital and labor to demonstrate
that the value of the revenue-raising contribution of an environ-
mental tax depends upon the extent to which there are taxes that are
even more distortionary than the labor tax.213
The new instrument choice framework (Figure 3 and 4) suggests
that the existing general equilibrium models can be usefully expanded
to analyze instruments that involve different types of government
spending.  Starting from a framework similar to that described in Fig-
ure 3, Richards examined the relative public finance impacts of taxes
(or auctioned marketable allowances), quotas, and subsidies in the
context of an analytical general equilibrium model similar to that of
Bovenberg and de Mooij.214  The study asked a somewhat different,
and arguably more policy-relevant, question than previous studies.
Rather than compare welfare before and after an environmental tax,
Richards took environmental regulation, in the form of a quota on a
polluting good, as given.215  The study then addressed two questions.
The first question was whether in the presence of a preexisting
210. It would be interesting to know what percentage of total costs under the regulatory re-
gime could be recouped by shifting to a tax approach.  Unfortunately, Terkla only provides ab-
solute and not relative potential cost savings. See id. at 115.
211. See Ian W.H. Parry & Roberton C. Williams III, A Second Best Evaluation of Eight
Policy Instruments to Reduce Carbon Emissions, 21 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECONOMICS 347,
350 (1999).
212. See Kenneth Richards, Rethinking Environmental Instrument Choice 40 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Richards, Rethinking Instrument Choice].
213. See A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Costs of Environmentally Motivated
Taxes in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses 50 NAT’L TAX J. 59, 64
(1997).
214. Compare Richards, Rethinking Instrument Choice, supra note 212, and Kenneth Ri-
chards, Integrating Science, Economics and Law into Policy: The Case of Carbon Sequestration
in Climate Change Policy 203-21 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pennsylvania)
(on file with author)[hereinafter Richards, Integrating Science], with Bovenberg & de Mooij,
supra note 201.
215. See Richards, Rethinking Instrument Choice, supra note 212, at 31; Richards, Inte-
grating Science, supra note 214, at 206.
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quota, imposing a tax on the polluting good unambiguously improves
welfare when revenues are recycled to decrease the labor tax.216  The
answer is yes; imposing a tax on the polluting good up to the point
where the quota constraint is no longer binding will improve wel-
fare.217  This is because using the tax on the polluting good replaces a
distortionary labor tax with a nondistortionary pollution tax.218
The second question was whether, given that the quota is going
to be tightened, an abatement subsidy would unambiguously lower
welfare relative to simply tightening the quota.219  Again, the answer is
yes, because providing the subsidy, which does nothing to lessen the
economic impact of the tightening regulation, requires the govern-
ment to raise additional revenue, increasing the distortionary effect of
the labor tax.220
Three primary points emerge from this brief discussion.  First, in
general the public finance impacts of environmental taxes will be
more positive than quotas that achieve the same result.221  Similarly,
the public finance impacts of either taxes or quotas will be more posi-
tive than environmental subsidies.222  Second, the costs of environ-
mental policies, such as tightening sulfur dioxide emissions or in-
creasing carbon sinks, cannot be meaningfully analyzed without
specifying which policy instruments will be used to implement the
policies.  For example, a bottom-up analysis of a carbon sequestration
program is likely to understate the costs of carbon sinks relative to
216. See Richards, Integrating Science, supra note 214, at 213.
217. This is the same as the finding in Terkla. See Terkla, supra note 203, at 115.
218. Because there is an existing binding quota on the polluting good, adding a tax does not
change production and consumption decisions.  Therefore, applying a tax to the polluting good
is akin to a lump-sum tax.  See Ian Parry, Reducing Carbon Emissions: Interactions with the Tax
System Raise the Cost, RESOURCES (Resources for the Future), Summer 1997, at 9, 10-11 (com-
paring the relative welfare effects of taxes and quotas in the presence of preexisting distortion-
ary taxes); Goulder et al., supra note 85, at 338 (comparing the public welfare effects of taxes,
quotas, performance standards, and technology standards in a second-best setting).
219. See Richards, Rethinking Instrument Choice, supra note 212, at 39-40.
220. For further discussion of the public finance effects of environmental subsidies, see DON
FULLERTON & ANN WOLVERTON, THE CASE FOR A TWO-PART INSTRUMENT: PRESUMPTIVE
TAX AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUBSIDY (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 5993,
1997); DON FULLERTON & GILBERT METCALF, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS, SCARCITY
RENTS, AND PRE-EXISTING DISTORTIONS (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No.
6091, 1997); Ian W.H. Parry, A Second-Best Analysis of Environmental Subsidies, 5 INT’L TAX &
PUB. FIN. 153 (1998).  Interestingly, no environmental policy studies have yet looked at the
public finance implications of using government production instruments relative to the alterna-
tives.
221. See Richards, Rethinking Instrument Choice, supra note 212, at 214-15.
222. See id. at 218.
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energy emissions reductions if it does not account for the fact that
emissions can be controlled with taxes or quotas but sinks will proba-
bly require subsidies or government production.
Third, it is unlikely that the trading ratios in hybrid systems that
use multiple instruments (e.g., deposit-refund systems, subsidy-charge
systems, auctioned marketable allowances with offsets, the Tar-
Pamlico point-nonpoint source “trading” program) should be one-to-
one.  Malik et al. discuss several reasons that a point-nonpoint source
trading program might require more than one unit of nonpoint source
reductions in exchange for an increase of one unit of point source
emissions allowances.223  These include the greater administration
costs and the greater uncertainty associated with measurement of
nonpoint source emissions.224  The current discussion suggests that the
differential public finance impacts may serve to complicate further
the derivation of a trading ratio where different instruments are used.
D.  Legal Constraints
Three types of legal constraints that affect instrument choice are
addressed below.  This section does not give an exhaustive analysis of
how legal constraints limit the government’s access to potentially effi-
cient environmental policy tools, but rather simply highlights the issue
as an important consideration in instrument choice analysis.225  The
clear message, however, is that the most efficient instruments as
evaluated on the basis of production, implementation, and public fi-
nance costs may not lie in the feasible set.
1.  Regulatory Takings
Where transaction costs are high because of asset specificity, un-
certainty, and obstacles to measurement, the government may choose
to use one of the instruments under which it retains discretion (gov-
ernment production or direct regulation on the right-hand side of
Figure 3).  The discussion above demonstrated that, on the basis of
public finance considerations, the regulatory approach may be pre-
ferred to that of government production.  However, there are consti-
tutional limitations on the types of activities that the United States
federal and state governments can mandate under regulation.  In par-
223. See Arun S. Malik et al., Point/Nonpoint Source Trading of Pollution Abatement:
Choosing the Right Ratio, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 959, 963-66 (1993).
224. See id. at 966.
225. For a more complete treatment of legal constraints on instrument choice, see Richards,
Integrating Science, supra note 214, at 222-62.
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ticular, constraints imposed by regulatory takings law may prevent
the government from employing the regulatory option.
The United States federal government employs the enterprise
and coercive modes under different constitutional powers.  The en-
terprise mode is carried out under the spending powers, while the co-
ercive mode invokes the taxing and commerce (regulatory) powers.
Despite the fact that they are both considered coercive powers, the
regulatory and taxing powers face different legal constraints.  The
federal regulatory power is constrained by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution from taking private property
without compensation.  Regulatory takings law defines, albeit imper-
fectly, the circumstances under which a regulation acts as if to take
private property, thus requiring compensation for the loss.
Until recently the “harm-benefit” rule-of-thumb has been a re-
markably reliable predictor of court decisions in takings cases.  Under
this test, if a regulation acts to prevent a “harm” it is a legitimate ex-
ercise of the regulatory power.226  But if a regulation requires the crea-
tion of a public “benefit,” compensation is required, raising the activ-
ity to a public enterprise. 227  This rule of thumb still leaves ample
room for dispute about what constitutes a harm or benefit, but it does
serve as a starting point for determining which of the two modes, co-
ercive or enterprise, the government would use to implement a pro-
gram.
In the past decade, however, the Supreme Court’s decisions on
regulatory takings have taken a different direction, broadening the
circumstances under which the Court will find a taking to have oc-
curred. 228  Recent Congresses have considered widening those circum-
stances further still. 229  Where governments are aware that their new
regulations will be regarded as a takings, they may choose to employ
the government production instrument, paying property owners to
acquire their property, or de facto be moved into government produc-
tion by the litigation process as in the case of Lucas v. South Carolina
226. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-837 (1987).
227. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
228. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring a municipal govern-
ment to pay compensation because development exactions sought from the property owner
were not in “rough proportionality” to the impacts of the proposed development).
229. For instance, the House of Representatives passed the Private Property Protection Act
of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995), which, if enacted into law, would have significantly ex-
panded the circumstances under which compensation would be required for reductions in pri-
vate property values caused by new regulations.
RICHARDS_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:57 AM
274 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:221
Coastal Council. 230
In contrast to the limits on the regulatory powers, there is rela-
tively little constitutional limit to the federal government’s use of the
taxing power.  Even where the motivation of an excise tax is clearly
regulatory and the effect of the tax is to render a business or property
completely unprofitable, the Court will not find that the tax works a
taking, provided that the tax raises revenue.231
The differential treatment of actions under the taxing power and
the regulatory power suggests that one instrument may be applied in
circumstances where the other cannot.  It also raises the interesting
question of how the court would treat auctioned marketable allow-
ances.232  Since allowance programs involve direct limitations on emis-
sions, and air pollution has always been controlled under the regula-
tory powers, a marketable allowance program may be subject to
review as regulation.  At the same time, if allowances are auctioned,
they clearly have revenue-raising properties and may be controlled
under the taxing powers.  A new marketable allowance program
therefore might enjoy unfettered freedom reviewed under the taxing
power, but might also run into the regulatory takings net, particularly
if Congress refined it to screen out further intrusions on private prop-
erty.
230. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), remanded to 309 S.C. 424 (1992)(finding that South Carolina’s
statutory provision restricting  use could be a “taking” if it eviscerated “all economically benefi-
cial uses of the land,” provided that the landowner possessed by right of title the usage rights
purported to be taken, according to the state common law; thus, remanding for determination of
the extent of this owner’s property interests).
For a discussion of this seminal case, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 59-61 (1995).  Not only did the state legislature
amend the law that regulated Lucas’ beachfront property, but the state also purchased the lots
from Lucas in a settlement agreement. See id. at 61.
231. In a reversal of a lower court opinion finding a local tax on parking facilities unconstitu-
tional because of the combination of an “unreasonably high” tax and the competition from the
city’s own, untaxed facilities, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged broad taxing
powers, observing, "[T]he Court has consistently refused either to undertake the task of passing
on the 'reasonableness' of a tax that otherwise is within the power of the Congress or of state
legislative authorities, or to hold that a tax is unconstitutional because it renders a business un-
profitable." City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 373 (1974).
232. The issue is not limited simply to judicial review of takings.  In developing rules to im-
plement the Montreal Protocol, EPA debated whether it would have the legal authority to auc-
tion the allowances.  “The EPA questioned whether such a regulatory auction would constitute
a delegation by Congress of its Constitutional powers to tax or to regulate commerce and
whether Congress had, in fact, delegated such authority to the EPA.” Hahn & McGartland, su-
pra note 4, at 609 n.64.
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2.  Federal versus State Regulation of Land Use
In some cases, such as carbon sequestration and nonpoint source
water pollution control, emissions abatement involves changing land-
use practices.  These changes tend to be complex and may invite in-
formation-economizing regulation rather than incentive-based ap-
proaches.  However, land-use control has traditionally rested at the
state and local level, not with the federal government.233  Vesting con-
trol in states may limit the capacity of the federal government to ad-
dress those land-use issues that transcend state boundaries.  In the
case of carbon sequestration, for example, the regulatory option for
increasing carbon sinks may be foreclosed if the federal government
cannot control forestland management.
However, the federal government is not without influence over
land-use regulation.234   Federal programs have had significant effects
on land-use issues such as nonpoint source water pollution control,
wetlands preservation, and coastal zone management, acting through
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act (CZMA).235  These three cases suggest some of the
boundaries of, and strategies for, federal influence over land-use is-
sues.  In none of the cases did the federal government directly regu-
late the land use in question.  Rather in all three cases, legislation re-
quired states to undertake a two-stage process: (1) develop
assessment reports and management plans, and (2) implement the
state-designed plans.  While state and local governments are able to
retain primary responsibility for land-use planning under this ap-
proach, the federal government exercises control through its provi-
sion of ground rules for the plans, its retention of veto power, and its
guidance of state governments.  In both the nonpoint source pollution
control program and the coastal zone management program, the fed-
eral government provided substantial funding to assist states in de-
veloping their management plans and subsequently implementing
those plans.  The CZMA demonstrated that the federal government
may be able to induce states to agree to share influence in one area by
increasing state control in another, e.g., control over federal lands.
233. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be
Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 489 (1989) (“With few exceptions, land use controls are a
local responsibility . . . .”).
234. See Robert H. Nelson, Federal Zoning: The New Era in Environmental Policy, in LAND
RIGHTS: THE 1990'S PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 295, 295-97 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995) (ar-
guing that the enactment of much of federal environmental laws has resulted in "the rise of a
new system of federal land-use regulation").
235. See id.
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Ultimately state acceptance will be a political issue, resolved by
states’ views of the balance between the benefits of federal assistance
and cooperation and the cost of partially surrendering local control
over land-use decisions.
3.  The Rule Against Legislative Entrenchment
The analysis of instruments above suggests that incentive-based
instruments can induce the private sector to efficiently invest in pollu-
tion abatement.  However, if those investments involve specialized
assets, private firms may look to the government to provide credible
commitments against opportunistic rent-seeking behavior such as re-
voking subsidies or changing the tax code after investments have been
made.  The government’s ability to provide commitments against op-
portunism may be limited by prohibitions on legislative entrench-
ment.
A general principle of legislative authority provides that one
legislature cannot bind the actions of its successors.236  Thus, “a legis-
lature has only limited capacity to provide stability and reassur-
ance.”237  This restriction has serious implications for the govern-
ment’s ability to make credible long-term commitments.238  With
respect to instrument choice, it may limit the range of candidate in-
struments.  For example, in the case of carbon sequestration, since it
takes several decades for most of the carbon removal to occur, it may
be difficult for the government to provide a meaningful promise to
make subsidy payments on an “as removed” basis.  Instead, the gov-
ernment may have to offer subsidies structured to provide larger ini-
tial payments.  The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires
the government to pay for services before they have been delivered.
While the prohibition on legislative entrenchment affects all
236. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislation Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381 (1987); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman
and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 219-28
(1986).
237. Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 647 (1988).
238. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government
Commitment, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 245, 250 (Pierre Boundieu &
James S. Coleman eds., 1991).  In the game theory and industrial economics literature this is
referred to as time inconsistency.  When expectations are rational, policymakers retain discre-
tion, and the game is against economic agents rather than nature, the social objective function
cannot be maximized. See, e.g., Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Dis-
cretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 487 (1977).  Consequently, a
government agent that follows rules limiting future options may be better able to advance social
welfare than an agent that retains discretion. See id. at 474, 487.
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three of the general categories of instruments aimed at influencing
private sector behavior,239 the effect is not uniform.  In the absence of
legally binding commitments, private parties will look for government
commitment as demonstrated through past government actions and
trends.  The instruments based most directly on the taxing and
spending powers (taxes and subsidies) will likely appear the least du-
rable, while those based on the regulatory powers (command-and-
control regulation and marketable allowances) may be deemed more
reliable.  Not only are the taxing instruments generally transitory, but
the rate of change among those instruments appears to be increasing,
with the greatest change among subsidies granted in the form of tax
credits.240
The government’s ability to credibly commit is most important
where private-party investment in specialized assets is critical to low-
cost delivery of environmental services.241  Further research should
shed light on mechanisms by which government can make credible
commitments.  For example, although government contracts are
239. Subsidies and contracts are payments to induce changes in private-party actions.  Envi-
ronmental taxes and marketable allowances are also intended to change private-sector behavior.
Command-and-control regulation uses the legal threat of fines or criminal sanctions to control
private parties.  In the context of Figure 3, only pure government production is carried out in
the absence of direct private-sector involvement.  For a discussion of the importance of gov-
ernment precommitment in the case of contracts and subsidies, see Logue, supra note 75.  For
the role of precommitment in the case of automobile regulations, see Yao, supra note 173; and
for precommitment related to prohibitions on seawalls in the face of rising sea levels, see Joseph
L. Sax, The Fate of Wetlands in the Face of Rising Sea Levels: A Strategic Proposal, 9 UCLA. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 143 (1991).
240. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and De-
creasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 922-23 (1987).
241. For example, states are finding that to attract investment they must make credible
commitments to developers of brownfields not to sue either current or future owners of the
sites. See Jim Nichols, Companies Getting Green Light to Oversee Own ‘Brownfields,’ THE
PLAIN DEALER, June 27, 1996, at 4B (metro section).  This issue extends well beyond the provi-
sion of environmental services, of course.  Electric utilities that made investments as regulated
monopolies now face enormous stranded costs as the federal and state governments move to-
ward competition in electricity generation. See Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Stranded
Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts, 11 J. REG. ECON. 41, 42
(1997) ("[T]he amounts at stake are enormous . . . .  [C]redible estimates of [utilities’ stranded
costs] range as high as $200 billion . . . ."); Leigh H. Martin, Note, Deregulatory Takings:
Stranded Investments and the Regulatory Compact in a Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 31
GA. L. REV. 1183, 1183-84 (1997) ("[T]he estimated value of these stranded investments ranges
from $10 billion to greater than $200 billion.").  This is essentially opportunistic behavior on the
part of the government following the utilities’ investment in specialized assets.  For a discussion
of similar issues in the telecommunications industry, see J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber,
Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996);
William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Con-
tract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037 (1997).
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based on the spending power and are subject to a different body of
law than private contracts, private parties may view them as providing
more reliable promises than a general subsidy provision.
V.  HEURISTIC PRINCIPLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL APPLICATIONS
The analysis in the previous sections provides some insight into
the three components of costs on which this study focuses—produc-
tion costs (PC), implementation costs (IC) and welfare losses associ-
ated with negative impacts on the public finance system (TX).  The
incentive-based instruments tend to encourage lower production
costs, though the level of savings depends upon the extent to which
the private sector is better able than the government to identify ap-
propriate technologies and innovations.  Where there are diverse op-
tions and applications for abatement, incentives are especially impor-
tant.  The coercive instruments in general, and the zero-baseline taxes
and auctioned marketable permits in particular, have superior public
finance characteristics.  The fact that taxes and marketable allow-
ances tend to minimize both PC and TX would seem to make them
the instruments of choice for environmental protection.  However,
these advantages might be overridden in some cases where the im-
plementation costs associated with incentive-based instruments are
sufficiently high due to information requirements, specialized assets,
and uncertainty.  Thus, no instrument dominates the others in all
cases.
Table 3 provides a summary of the relation between several pro-
grammatic and technological characteristics and the relative attrac-
tiveness of selected individual instruments.  A plus sign indicates that
an increase in that factor increases the applicability of the instrument,
while a minus sign indicates lower applicability.
Taxes and auctioned marketable allowances generally involve
lower production costs and less negative impacts on the public finance
system than the other instruments.  Thus, a higher marginal cost of
public funds would tend to make the coercive mode more attractive,
and taxes or auctioned allowances particularly so.  Taxes and market-
able allowances are also favored when there is a wide range of
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technological options from which to choose, and technological inno-
vation is apt to be important in reducing the cost of abatement over
time.
In contrast, where abatement involves highly specialized assets,
the program goals and rules are subject to high uncertainty, the gov-
ernment’s credible commitments against opportunistic behavior are
costly, and the cost of measuring or modeling the accomplishments of
private parties is high, the government may need to retain more dis-
cretion for itself by directly producing the abatement service or using
command-and-control regulation.  Generally command-and-control
regulation should be preferred to the enterprise mode instruments on
the basis of public finance considerations.  However, in some cases,
particularly those where the abatement activity is not directly linked
to the emission itself, the government may be constrained by takings
law from requiring private parties to provide the abatement service.
Moreover, where the abatement activity involves changes in pri-
vate land use, the federal government, generally excluded from direct
land-use regulation, may have to rely on a combination of subsidies to
landowners, government production, and incentives for states and lo-
cal governments to adopt the needed regulations.
In general, where there is uncertainty around the marginal cost
of abatement, either price-based or quantity-based instruments might
be preferred.  The steeper the marginal abatement cost curve, the
more beneficial is a price-based system, such as taxes or subsidies.
The flatter the marginal abatement curve, ceteris paribus, the more
preferable become the quantity-based approaches, such as market-
able allowances and contracts.242
242. Because this article does not address the quantity versus price issue in the context of
the hierarchical instruments, Table 3 will simply register question marks and leave that question
for future discussion.
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF FACTORS
AFFECTING INSTRUMENT CHOICE
INSTRUMENT
SubsidiesContracts
Government
Production
Zero-
Baseline
Taxes
Auctioned
Marketable
Allowances
  Command-
and-Control
Regulation
MARGINAL COST
OF PUBLIC FUNDS – – – ++ ++ +
IMPLEMENTATION
COST FACTORS
Asset Specificity
– – + – – +
Program Uncertainty – – + – – +
Cost of Output
Measurement – – + – – +
Relative Steepness of
(Uncertain) Marginal
Abatement Curve
+ – ? + – ?
PRODUCTION
COST FACTORS
Diversity of
Applications + + – + + –
Innovation Potential
+ + – + + –
LEGAL FACTORS
Benefit Providing
+ + + + ? –
Land Use Changing
+ + + – – –
A plus sign indicates a positive correlation between that factor and the attractiveness of
the corresponding instrument.  For example, command-and-control regulations are
more attractive relative to the enterprise mode instruments (subsidies, contracts, and
government production), if the marginal cost of public funds is believed to be high.
Revenue-raising zero-baseline taxes and auctioned marketable allowances, designated
with a double plus, would be even more attractive.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article endeavors to advance understanding of the relation
among instruments by providing a conceptual framework.  First, it
expands the scope of instrument choice beyond the common narrow
focus on market-based instruments and command-and-control regula-
tion.  In particular, it incorporates the government production and
contracting instruments.
Second, by delineating the two most important characteristics of
instruments (i.e., who pays and who controls abatement generation
decisions), it places the instruments in their proper relation to each
other.  Most noticeably, subsidies, which are generally lumped in with
other incentive-based tools in the instrument choice literature, are
grouped under this taxonomy with contracts, which are generally ex-
cluded entirely from those studies.  Subsidies and contracts as defined
in this article are simply price-based and quantity-based mechanisms
for achieving the same goals.
Third, by reorganizing the evaluation criteria as a constrained
optimization problem, this approach helps frame the analysis of the
public finance impacts of choosing one instrument over another.  The
choice among instruments along the vertical axis of Figures 3 and 4
have profound implications for the government’s revenue-raising re-
quirements.
Fourth, the taxonomy identifies the constitutional powers under
which each instrument is exercised.  This is a necessary first step in
analyzing the legal constraints on the use of the instruments.
Fifth, it applies lessons developed in the New Institutional Eco-
nomics and the contract governance literatures to the instruments ad-
dressed in the more traditional environmental policy literature.  It
preserves the useful distinction between regulation and incentive-
based controls without succumbing to the false dichotomy.
Sixth, it differentiates between the provision of abatement serv-
ices and the provision of information about abatement.  Identifying
which type of market failure the agency is attempting to correct, ex-
ternality or public good, clarifies the instrument choice process.
Seventh, this framework raises issues of trading ratios for linked
programs, such as deposit-refund, tax-subsidy, or market allowance-
offset programs.  For example, if the government is taxing carbon
emissions and subsidizing carbon sinks, the two approaches have dif-
ferent impacts on the public finance system.  If the differences are
RICHARDS_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:57 AM
282 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:221
substantial, as they may well be, it is possible that the optimal ratio of
tax to subsidy could be substantially greater than one.
Finally, the distinction between abatement costs and residual en-
vironmental damages emphasizes the issues of equity and fairness in-
herent in deciding who bears these two types of costs.  These issues
quickly translate into political constraints that may render many envi-
ronmental policy strategies (such as carbon sequestration) infeasible
if decision-makers consider only the coercive instruments.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1:  EVALUATION CRITERIA FROM
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENT CHOICE LITERATURE
MAJONE (1976)
1. Environmental
Effectiveness
2. Economic Efficiency
3 Political and Administra-
tive Feasibility
4. Compatibility with
Existing Institutions
5. Polluter Pays Principle
BOHM & RUSSELL (1985)
1. Static Efficiency
2. Information Intensity
3. Ease of Monitoring and
Enforcement
4. Flexibility in the Face of
Economic Change
5. Dynamic Incentives
6. Political Considerations
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
(1989)
1. Efficiency
2. Informational
Requirements
3. Distributional Effects
4. Political Sustainability
5. Applicability
PROJECT 88—ROUND II
(1991)*
1. Efficacy with Respect to
Environmental Goals
2. Cost-Effectiveness
3. Information Require-
ments
4. Monitoring and
Enforcement Costs
5. Flexibility in Face of
Changes in Tastes, Tech-
nology, Resource Use
6. Dynamic Incentives for
Innovation and Adoption
of New Technology
7. Resolvability of Distribu-
tional Equity Issues
8. Understandability to
Public
9. Political Feasibility
* See also Hahn & Stavins
(1993)
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT (1995)
1. Cost-Effectiveness
2. Fairness
3. Demand on Government
Resources
4. Assurance Goals Will be
Met
5. Prevention vs. Cleanup
6. Environmental Equity
and Justice
7. Adaptability
8. Technology Innovation
and Diffusion
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (1996)
1. Environmental
Considerations
a. Target pollutants
b. Other environmental
impacts
2. Economic and Social
Considerations
a. Cost-effectiveness
b. Project level
considerations
c. Macro-economic
considerations
d. Equity considerations
3. Administrative,
Institutional, and Political
Considerations
a. Administrative
burden
b. Political
considerations
c. Replicability
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TABLE A2: SUMMARY OF INSTRUMENT CATEGORIES FROM SAMPLE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LITERATURE
Stahr (1971)
1. Product Standards
2. Production Process Stan-
dards
3. Taxes on Emissions
4. Subsidies for Pollution
Control
5. Government Expenditure
on Abatement Projects
Majone (1976)
1. Regulation, Direct Public
Action, and Subsidies
2. Effluent Charges
3. Contract and Redefinition
of Property Rights
4. Organization
Baumol and Oates (1979)
1. Moral Suasion
2. Direct Controls
a. Regulation of levels of
emissions
b. Specification of
processes or equip-
ment
3. Market Processes
a. Tax on environ-
mental damage
i. Rates based on
damage
ii. Rates designed
to achieve pre-
set environ-
mental quality
standard
b. Subsidies
i. Payments per
unit of pollution
reduction
ii. Subsidies to
defray equip-
ment costs
c. Marketable pollu-
tion licences
i. Sale of licenses
to highest bid-
der
ii. Equal distribu-
tion of licenses
d. Refundable depos-
its against environ-
mental damage
e. Allocation of
property rights
4. Government Investment
Facilities
a. Regenerative
facilities
b. Dissemination of
information
c. Research
d. Education
Bohm and Russell (1985)
1. Prices and Taxes
2. Tradeable Rights
3. Deposit-Refund Systems
and Performance Bonds
4. Liability
5. Regulation
a. Forcing  private
negotiation
b. Performance
standards
c. Regulating decision
variables correlated
to emissions
d. Design standards
e. Bans on products or
processes
6. Government Investment in
Protection and Restoration
7. Moral Suasion
Bressers and Klok (1988)
1. Creating Alternatives
(Technological Develop-
ment)
2. Alternatives Reduction
(Physical Intervention)
3. Changing Pros and Cons of
Alternatives
4. Changing Valuation of
Outcomes
5. Information Provision
Department of Energy (1989)
1. Regulation
a. Regulation by
controls
i. Bans
ii. Emissions
controls
iii. Input controls
iv. Consumption
controls
v. Price controls
vi. Rate of return
regulation
b. Standards
i. Technology
standards
ii. Licensing and
certification
2. Fiscal Incentives
a. Emission fees
b. Tradeable emission
rights
c. Deposit-refund
systems
d. Taxes
i. Excise taxes
ii. Taxes on firms
iii. Personal income
tax
iv. Property taxes
v. Tariffs
e. Subsidies
f. Direct government
expenditure
i. R&D support
ii. Direct govern-
ment purchases
3. Information
a. Advertising and
labeling
b. Education
c. Moral suasion
d. Signaling
4. Research, Development,
and Demonstration
a. Public invention
support programs
b. Commercialization
education
c. Provision of spe-
cialized information
d. Demonstrations
Hahn (1989)
1. Standards
a. Ambient standards
controlling environ-
mental quality
b. Emissions standards
i. Technology-
based standards
ii. Performance
standards
2. Subsidies
3. Taxes and Emissions Fees
4. Tradeable Permits
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Environmental Protection
Agency (1990)
1. Conventional Regulations
a. Standards
b. Use restrictions
c. Product design
2. Market Incentives
a. Pollution charges
b. Permit systems
3. Scientific/Technical Meas-
ures (R&D)
4. Provision of Information
5. Enforcement
6. Cooperation with Other
Government Agencies and
Nations
Project 88C Round II (1991)*
1. Command-and-Control
a. Technology-based
standards
b. Uniform
performance standards
2. Market-Based Instruments
a. Pollution charges
b. Tradeable permits
c. Deposit-refund
systems
d. Market barrier
reductions
e. Government-subsidy
elimination
* Also similar: Project 88
(1988), Stavins (1992),
Hahn and Stavins (1991,
1992), Stavins (1998)
Office of Technology Assess-
ment (1995)
1. Direct Limitations
a. Single-source tools
i. Harm-based
standards
ii. Design standards
iii. Technology
specifications
iv. Product bans and
limits
b. Multisource tools
i. Integrated
permitting
ii. Tradeable
emissions
iii. Challenge
regulations
2. Indirect Limitations
a. Pollution charges
b. Liability
c. Information
reporting
d. Subsidies
e. Technical assistance
Department of Energy (1996)
1. Information and Education
2. Voluntary Programs
3. Research, Development
and Demonstration
4. Regulation
5. Market-Based Incentives
Callan and Thomas (1996)
1. Command-and-Control
a. Technology-based
standards
b. Performance-based
standards
2. Market-Based
a. Pollution Charge
i. Effluent charge
ii. Product charge
iii. User charge
iv. Service charge
b. Subsidy
c. Deposit/Refund
d. Pollution permit
market
i. Credit system
ii. Allowance
system
Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (1996)
1. Market-Based Programs
a. Taxes
b. Full-cost pricing
c. Subsidies
 d. Phaseout of
subsidies
e. Tradeable emissions
quotas
2. Voluntary Agreements
a. Energy  use and
emissions standards
b. Government
procurement
c. Promotional
programs
3. Regulatory Measures
a. Mandatory building
or equipment
standards
b. Product and prac-
tices bans
c. Nontradeable
emissions quotas
4. Research, Development
and Demonstration
Fisher et al. (1996)
1. Conventional Regulation
2. Market-Based Instruments
a. Taxes and subsidies
b. Tradeable permits
3. Other Complementary
Policies
a. Education and provi-
sion of information
b. Family planning
c. Modification of trade
policy and subsidies
Blackman and Harrington
(1998)
1. Economic Incentives
a. Direct (emissions
fees, marketable
permits)
b. Indirect (environ-
mental taxes)
2. Command-and-Control
a. Direct (emissions
standards)
b. Indirect (technology
standards)
3. Government Investment
a. Direct (road paving,
waste disposal plants)
b. Indirect (R&D in
clean technology)
4. Informal Regulation
Table A2 (Continued): Summary of Instrument Categories from Sample of Environmental
Policy Literature
